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(i) 
ABSTRACT. 
The central concern of this paper is an examination of the political 
economy approach to the questions of regional and national imbalance 
in the distribution of economic activity, and an application of this 
approach to environmental issues in general as well as to the 
specific economic and environmental problems facing Tasmania. Basic 
tenets of the centre-periphery approach to the question of spatial 
imbalance include (a) that regional imbalances are but the spatial 
expression of certain characteristics of the private-enterprise 
system; (b) that the relevant characteristics include i) private 
investment decisions according to considerations of private gain, 
ii) divergence and conflict between the public and private costs and 
benefits of such decisions, resulting in iii) uneven development 
manifesting itself in inequalities of various forms and at various 
levels, which are both undesirable and cumulative; and 
(c) that a vital link exists between the various parts of the system 
so that each part can only be studied in the context of the 
operations of the whole. 
These arguments are exemplified by consideration of the two most 
important applications of the centre-periphery approach: its 
application in explaining inequalities between regions and its 
application in explaining inequalities between nations. 
At the level of regions, it is argued that, contrary to the 
assumptions and expectations of orthodox theory, not only do 
inequalities exist and persist but also that they are growing over 
time and, further, that this constitutes a problem. It is found 
that the 'centre' is almost invariably favoured by private investors 
over the 'periphery', thus reinforcing the advantages that the 
former already holds over the latter in terms of an economic 
structure more favourable to growth. 
The argument is extended to the level of nations and the centre-
periphery (or dependency) approach is contrasted to orthodox 
development theory. The former views both development and under-
development as the necessary result and contemporary manifestation 
of a single system, the product of a single yet d].alectically 
contradictory economic structure and process whose mechanisms are 
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(ii) 
colonial and neo-colonial relations between the developed and the 
underdeveloped parts of the capitalist world. Where the orthodox 
approach sees poverty, tradition and backwardness as the defining 
characteristics of underdevelopment, to the dependency theorists 
poverty and backwardness are symptoms of underdevelopment and 
underdeveloped countries are not_ 'traditional' societies. 
According to this approach the defining characteristics of under-
development are external dependence of a form which results in 
(and is perpetuated by) the disarticulation of the various sectors 
of the economic system and the extraction of surplus. Persisting 
and cumulative inequalities between nations are explained in terms 
of the 'mechanisms of imperialism', to be found in the forms of 
trade and other linkages between developed and underdeveloped 
countries and reflected in the latters' internal structures as well 
as in their external relations . 
It is finally argued that the centre-periphery approach to 
questions of intra- and inter-national imbalances and inequalities 
offers significant insights to the study of environmental issues 
and can contribute to the construction of a more satisfactory 
theoretical framework for this pur?ose. 
1. 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE 
i) INTRODUCTION. 
The slow rate of growth of economic activity in Tasmania, stemming 
from the State's apparent inability to attract and retain sufficient 
levels of industrial activity, has manifested - and continues to 
manifest - itself in an employment structure characterised by high 
levels of unemployment relative to the rest of Australia; low 
levels of participation in the work force, particularly by married 
women and young people; a steady flow of net outmigration; 
relatively low levels of per capita income; limited choice of 
employer and a restricted range of available types of employment; 
limited promotion prospects; limited career opportunities of an 
administrative nature; and a relative lack of stability of employment 
due to the State's greater sensitivity to conditions of boom, slump 
and structural adjustment. 
These employment characteristics are, in turn, closely related to 
the nature of Tasmania's industrial structure, predominant character-
istics of which include: 
Industry dominated by large export-oriented mining and 
manufacturing enterprises (almost invariably with head offices 
in other states or countries) with emphasis on resource 
extraction and basic first stage processing and a consequent 
lack of more sophisticated types of processing and manufacturing; 
An economy vulnerable (to a considerably greater degree than the 
rest of Australia as a whole) to the periodic changes in 
international prices and demand related to the State's export 
products, stemming largely from its relatively narrow export 
~: 0cialisation, both in terms of products and markets; 
Dependence of entire regional communities on the (international) 
fortunes of a single dominant industry, or even a single 
company. 
The structure of industry and its relat~on to Tasmania's employment 
situation were the subject of a recent Federal Government Inquiry, whose 
Report characterised the State's industrial structure as 'unbalanced', 
'uneven' and 'dissimilar to that in other states' (Callaghan 1977). 
According to Callaghan, one of the most important factors to 
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which this state of affairs can be attributed is Tasmania's physical 
separation from mainland Australia. "The major disability facing 
the people of Tasmania .•• is that Tasmania is an island" 
(Callaghan 1977, p.3). When however, one considers the striking 
similarities between Tasmania's problems and those faced by the 
peripheral - i.e. remote from the major centres of industry - parts 
of many countries (such as the U.K., Italy, the U.S., France and 
Canada, to give but a few examples from a~ong the so-called 
'developed world'), most of which are not physically separate from 
the rest of their respective national economies, the conclusion 
must emerge that the Bass Strait is in reality a small additional 
burden alongside the general problems common to remote regions 
(Wilde 1977). 
While, therefore, any important peculiarities of the Tasmanian 
situation must be firmly borne in mind, the evidence would seem to 
suggest that they do not by themselves offer a satisfactory explanation 
of the difficulties facing the State in its attempts to attract and 
retain high levels and diverse types of industry. The basis for such 
an explanation would instead seem to consist of the suggestion that 
there exists11 a general and very distinct response by economic 
enterprises to different locations within a country, in other words 
activities are carefully organised in space" (Wilde 1977, p.3). 
The approach followed in Lhis paper is broadly consistent with this 
observation and is based on the notion that spatial inequalities are 
the manifestation of the operation of the economic system under which 
industrial location decisions are made; in other words, a 
satisfactory explanation of the existence and persistence of regional 
inequalities must be sought in terms of the behaviour of individual 
business firms responsible for decisi.r·ns about investment location 
and expansion. In turn, the rationale behind this behaviour must 
be sought in terms of some of the defining characterestics of the 
socio-economic system, including i) private investment decisions 
according to considerations of private gain, and ii) divergence 
and conflict between the public and private costs and benefits of 
such decisions. The combined effect of these system-defining 
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characteristics is uneven development, manifesting itself in 
inequalities of various forms and at various levels, which are both 
undesirable and cumulative. 
The explanation of regional inequalities will therefore be 
sought in terms of the general theoretical framework known as the 'centre-
periphery model', which puts particular emphasis on the forces leading 
to increasing regional imbalance (Stilwell 1974). The application of 
this model in explaining a) inequalities between regions and b) 
inequalities between nations will be considered in turn and will be 
contrasted to the respective mainstream paradigms. 
At the level of regions, it will be argued that not only do 
inequalities exist and persist but also that a) they are growing over 
time, and b) this constitutes a problem on grounds of efficiency, equity, 
economic health and environment. This will be done in terms of both 
a priori reasoning and empirical observations. Stress will be placed 
here on the nature of the grounds on which individual investing units 
(private business firms) make decisions affecting the location of their 
investments. Almost invariably, the 'centre' is favoured over the 
'periphery', thus reinforcing the advantages that the former already 
enjoys in terms of an economic structure more favourable co growth. 
Attention will also be given at this level to the argument that, for 
various reasons, activities that might have once been located in 
peripheral regions are increasingly being located in, or transferred 
to, underdeveloped countries. That is, instead of 'going multi-
· ·· · · regional', large firms are increasingly 'going multi-natio'nal'. 
At the level of nations, the centre-periphery approach to the 
question of development and underdevelopment * will be likewise 
contrasted to the orthodox pooition. A very important divergence 
from the orthodox position is that the centre-periphery approach 
views both development and underdevelopment as the necessary 
simultaneous result and contemporary manifestation of a single yet 
dialectically contradictory economic structure and process. Thus, 
where the orthodox approach views the two as relative and quantitative, 
*Perhaps better known in this context as the dependency approach 
... 
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the centre-periphery approach sees them as relational and qualitative. 
The defining characteristics of underdevelopment are therefore 
seen not as tradition, poverty and backwardness (although these may 
well be symptoms of underdevelopment), but as external dependence of 
the structural type (Galtung 1971, Senghaas 1975a), characterised by 
a disarticulated economic system (Amin 1974) and the extraction of 
surplus (Frank 1971; Baran 1973; Galtung 1971) - a very important 
implication being that some so-called 'underdeveloped' countries may 
not be underdeveloped at all, while, more important, some countries 
or regions traditionally referred to as part of the 'developed world' 
may well be underdeveloped. 
Finally, this paper will raise the question of the possible 
applicability of this underdevelopment model to the Tasmanian economy. 
ii) RATIONALE 
Before we turn to the questions of regional and national imbalance, 
it seems appropriate to engage in an attempt at explaining certain 
aspects of both the choice of topic and the choice of approach, as 
well as the crucial importance of the issues at hand to the study of 
environmental problems. Additionally, an acknowledgment of what this 
paper is not about and certain possible shortcomings and limitations 
seems necessary. It will be necessary to pursue certain questions 
in the explanatory part in some detail, as this paper possibly 
constitutes a somewhat radical departure from what is considered 
normal and acceptable by the ce'ntre for Environmental Studies. 
The sorts of questions that might be raised here include the 
questio:i. of choice of topic ("What is the relevance of a discussion 
of regi.•_• .... al and national inequalities to the study of environmental 
issues?"); the question of choice of approach ("Why choose to deal 
with this topic in terms of what may be termed a controversial 
approach?"); and the question of content ("Why bring together such 
academically separate areas of study as regional imbalance in countries 
of the 'developed West' and underdevelopment?"). It might be noted 
at the outset that the answers to these questions are clearly 
interrelated: thus the discussion on underdevelopment becomes highly 
relevant to the study of environmental issues largely because it is 
• 
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carried out in the centre-periphery framework; while the relevance 
of regional and other inequalities to a satisfactory understanding 
of environmental problems becomes more apparent in the light of the 
answers to the remaining two questions. In view of this, it may 
clarify the argument somewhat if the first question is tackled last. 
Taking the question of approac~ first, the centre-periphery 
paradigm was chosen for a number of reasons. 
First, there is the obvious one, namely that it happens to form 
a more satisfactory basis for the understanding of the existence, 
persistence and growth of inequalities both between regions and between 
countries - 'obvious' because, unless this was the case, another 
approach would have to be followed. What must for the time being 
stand as an assertion will be taken up in the following two chapters. 
It might not however be too soon to mention that profound 
dissatisfaction with existing theories of both regional imbalance and 
underdevelopment was expressed as long as twenty years ago by a writer 
of some renown in both fields: While adamantly stressing what he 
terms the Logical Necessity of a Theory, 
II Theory is indispensable to scientific work. Theory is 
necessary not only to organize the findings of research so that they 
make sense, but, more basically, to determine what questions are to 
be asked. Scientific knowledge never emerges by itself, so to speak, 
from empirical research in the raw, but only as solutions to 
problems raised; and such solutions presume a logically coordinated 
system of problems stated. Theory, therefore, must always be a priori 
to the empirical observation of the facts. Facts come to mean 
something only as ascertained and organized in the frame of a theory. 
Indeed, facts as parts of scientific knowledge have no existence 
outside such a frame. Questions must 0c asked before answers can be 
obtained and, in order to make sense, the questions must be part of 
a logically coordinated attempt to understand social reality as a whole. 
A non-theoretical approach is, in strict logic, unthinkable." 
Myrdal (1963, p.160) quickly continues to add that 
"In our present situation the task is not, as is sometimes assumed, 
the relatively easy one of filling 'empty boxes' of theory with a 
content of empirical knowledge about reality. For our theoretical 
boxes are empty primarily because they are not built in such a way 
."" ... - . 
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that they can hold reality. We need new theories which, however 
abstract, are more realistic in the sense that they are to a higher 
degree adequate to the facts", concluding that "attempting to do 
without a general theory would seem to be a safer course than one 
that is biased and faulty", characterised by 11biased and inadequate 
predilections and unreal and irrelevant theoretical approaches" 
(Myrdal 1963, pp.160,163, 164). 
The use of such a lengthy quote is justified in that it contains, 
or points to, the second reason for the choice of approach: A 
theoretical rather than an empirical approach was chosen largely 
because fact-finding in the environmental field, as in any other, is, 
as Myrdal eloquently points out, unthinkable and illogical outside 
a "logically coordinated attempt to understand social reality as a 
whole". Such an understanding however, it will soon be argued, 
is largely non-existent in this field. The centre-periphery approach 
would therefore seem invaluable in this connection, deriving as it 
does from the broader field of political economy, which stresses and 
highlights the interconnections between problems of space, the 
environment, etc. on the one hand and the broader workings of the 
socio-economic system under which they occur on the other. 
Thirdly, it is a great merit of the centre-periphery approach 
that it points out the way in which seemingly unrelated and geographic-
ally distant environmental problems are in fact intimately connected 
to each other. Tfilus, for example, Tasmania's inability to attract 
its 'fair' share and range of industrial activity creates - or 
intensifies it wil·l be argued - what may be termed the 
environmental problems of the periphery: rapid resource depletion, 
inadequate or underenforced environmental legislation, etc. The same 
mechanism responsible for this (viz. uneven development) also causes 
or intensifies what may be termed the environmental problems of the 
ce~tre - pollution, congestion. Concentrating separately on the two 
sets of problems would therefore amount to the artificial compartment-
alization of what is in reality a single process. The centre-periphery 
paradigm seems, however, capable of establishing the necessary 
connection. The example can of course be extended to consider in a 
similar light the environmental problems of underdevelopment and 
overdevelopment respectively, of 'too much' and 'too little'. 
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7. 
Lastly, while it is undeniably correct to point out that the 
proposed approach is controversial and, particularly in its application 
to the underdevelopment field, has become identified with the 'neo-
Marxist left', it by no means follows that research based on it must 
necessarily be ideologically biased, subjective, or pseudo-scientific. 
According to one of its pioneering proponents, such suppositions 
form part of that false liberal maxim "according to which only 
political neutrality permits scientific objectivity, a maxim widely 
used to defend social irresponsibility, pseudo-scientific scientism, 
and political reaction" (Frank 1971, p.18). Furthermore, Frank 
argues, such an approach is not only permissable but indispensable 
regardless of personal cost: "A conscientious effort to develop it 
even at the cost of some intellectual security and personal ease, is 
the least of the sacrifices that history can ask of us" (Frank 1971, 
p.19). 
Turning from the question of approach to the question of content, 
it need only be pointed out that the seeming separateness of regional 
imbalance and underdevelopment is largely a product of the artificial 
compartmentalization pointed out above, itself a product of 'academic 
specialisation' generated by and itself generating rigidly separated 
disciplines and partial theoretical approaches to what is essentially 
an indivisibly single process. While therefore one may not 
necessarily or readily agree with Carney et.al. (1976, p.11) when 
they argue that nations such as France and Britain are "attempting 
to internalise th~ir lost empires by importation of alien labour and 
regional underdevelopmene1 , no reasonable exception can be taken with 
Galtung's argument that the mechanisms of development and underdevelop-
ment he discusses "are used not only between nations but also within 
nations':, (1971, p.90), nor to Myrdal's considered conclusion that 
"the two L:ypes of inequality are a cause of each other in the circular 
way of the cumulative process" (1963, p.50). 
Another fundamental although related reason however exists for 
the discussion of development and underdevelopment as well as regional 
imbalance in this paper: Not only are regional and national 
inequalities symptoms of the same mechanisms and processes, but also 
the mechanisms and processes involved are much more clearly 
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discernible in the case of the latter. This is due first to the 
existence of much greater inequalities between nations than between 
regions and, secondly, to the more systematic and sophisticated 
attention that has been given to the former than to the latter, 
especially by writers such as Baran (1973), Frank (1971), Amin (1974) 
and Galtung (1971). The content of these writers' works, rich in 
ideas and concepts, may well provide invaluable assistance in 
arriving at a new set of understandings for dealing with problem 
regions such as Tasmania, providing a new set of perspectives that can 
illuminate new aspects of the problem; further, it is hoped that they 
will assist in adding substance to the argument that underlying a wide 
range of environmental problems is the question of inequality and 
uneven development. 
Having dealt with questions of approach and content, we will now 
turn to the question of topic or, more precisely, the question of the 
relevance or usefulness of a discussion on spatial inequality and 
uneven development to the study of environmental issues. As this is 
largely the subject of a following chapter, it will only be given 
brief consideration here. 
At the general level, many environmentalists' understanding of 
socio-economic systems, theories and processes is severely limited. 
This may be viewed partly as a consequence of their natural science-
background and of the insis~ence of many among them that "the 
environment transcends politics and economic theories". Yet, such 
understanding is vital: It is becoming increasingly clear that 
problems of population, hunger, pollution, resource depletion, urban-
isation and employment, to mention but a few examples of ecological 
and spatial imbalance, are both interrelated and intimately 
associated with the pervasive socio-eco~omic imbalances characteristic 
of our economic system. A discussion of such imbalances within the 
political economy framework of the centre-periphery approach may be 
the best available starting point for generating such understanding, 
not only because. the approach recognizes and makes these crucial 
interconnections' explicit, but also because, in doing so, it becomes 
akin to ecology, thus constituting an approach that ecologically-minded 
environmentalists can understand. 
At a less general level, the present approach ~o the questions 
of regional and national imbalance implies a radically different 
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approach to, and may enhance the understanding of, quite specific 
environmental issues such as pollusion, resource depletion, soil 
erosion and 'overpopulation'. 
As stated above, these issues will be examined a little more 
systematically in another chapter. What remains to be said here is 
to acknowledge what this paper is not about, as well as to point 
out some of its limitations and shortcomings. 
It is not intended that an exhaustive treatise be carried out 
of either regional imbalance or underdevelopment. Time and space 
limitations (as well as the author's lack of academic training in 
either of these disciplines) mean that the treatment of the issues 
will be rather schematic and the selection of authors and points of 
view arbitrary to a certain extent. The aim however is not a 
bibliographic review, but an exercise in drawing on these disciplines 
in an attempt to arrive at an improved set of understandings which 
may prove useful in their application to the study of environmental 
problems. 
Secondly, this paper does not purport to be other than a partial 
contribution. Thus, the question of the role of the state in relation 
to social change, a major aspect of the political economy approach 
and of particular relevance to environmental issues (Gunningham 1974) 
has not been entered into as it could be the subject of such a paper 
on its own. All that will be .said on this issue is that the 
conventional view, assuming that social problems need only"be high-, 
lighted by concerned 'moral crusaders' for government to take action, 
implies a "false element of automaticity" (Stilwell 1974; Gunningham 
1974). Nor has the question of whether the capitalist mode of 
production is inherently anti-ecological been explicitly entered into 
- although some of the arguments presented here, as well as the 
evidence available in numerous published works (e.g. Heilbroner 1975; 
Weisberg 1971) would tend to suggest that this is in fact the 
case. To satisfactorily deal with this question one would need to 
a) isolate certain system-defining institutions of capitalism, e.g. 
production and consumption activity organized privately and for 
private profit, the need for continuous expansion, the problem of 
surplus-absorption (Baran and Sweezy, 1968) and underconsumption, etc; 
b) show that these institutions and contradictions are central rather 
than peripheral to the capitalist mode of production; and 
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c) demonstrate the anti-ecological character of this mode of pro-
duction by showing environmentally destructive activity to be 
the necessary concomitant of the normal functioning of these 
institutions and contradictions. In other words, one would again 
be writing a paper on its own. 
Thirdly, the ideas and concepts discussed in this paper do not 
claim a high degree of originality. However it is believed that 
they are largely new to a sizeable proportion of those concerned 
with the study of environmental deterioration, particularly in the 
case of Tasmania, and this seems sufficient to satisfy the primary 
aim (see above). 
Lastly, one must 2gree with Carney et.al. (1976) that in 
attempting this kind of project it is difficult to strike a correct 
balance between theoretical sophistication and attention to empirical 
detail. Any conclusions that will emerge should be therefore 
treated not as a series of clear-cut answers but as a set of 
perspectives that illuminate new aspects of the problem. 
11. 
CHAPTER 2: UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT: THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
According to much of orthodox regional theory (e.g. Lefeber 1958) 
there should be no regional problem. This follows from the premises 
of the spatial equilibrium approach which, assuming perfect 
information and unfettered movements of labour and capital, argues 
that, in a situation of regional disparity, labour will flow from 
the low-employment, low-wage region to that of high employment and 
wages, while capital will tend to flow in the opposite direction. 
Thus, in the long run, spatial equilibrium will be established, in 
a process of harmonious self-adjustment, with any change from 
equilibrium towards disequilibrium automatically setting forth a 
series of counteracting, equilibrium-restoring changes. It is 
therefore argued that such regional disparities as there may exist 
within a nation will balance out, and any remaining disparities in 
levels of profits, wages or employment between regions would be 
frictional and peripheral to what is essentially self-equibriating 
economic apparatus. 
Yet, the promises of such a self-adjusting, harmony-inducing 
model have not been fulfilled, and fail to correspond to the 
observable realities of persistent inequalities in regional income 
and employment levels and rates of growth. The self-balancing 
spatial equilibrium model h~s been refuted by writers such as Myrdal 
(1963), Friedmann (1966), Stilwell (1972a; 1972b; 1974), and Holland 
(1975; 1976),- both on empirical and theoretical grounds. These 
writers have, in turn, preferred to adopt the centre-periphery approach 
to the question of regional imbalance, which both corresponds to and 
explains the reality of persistent regional inequality which not 
only does not dimiuish but widens overtime. 
A refutation of the orthodox spatial-equilibrium approach may 
be carried out as follows: 
First, the empirical observation that, as just stated, regional 
inequalities are not only not diminishing but, on the whole, increasing 
overtime, especially in the absence of government regional development 
policies, but also often in spite of these. 
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... Second, an explanation of the reasons why the orthodox 
approach has so obviously failed to correspond to 
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reality. Such explanation needs to a) point to those parts of 
the spatial equilibrium model which are theoretically unsound and 
unrealistic, and b) make a number of empirical observations 
pointing out actual developments which the orthodox approach failed 
to take into account. 
Thirdly, an alternative explanation of uneven development and 
growing regional disparities, in terms of the rationality of private 
investment decision-makers operating in a given economic framework, 
and the mechanisms of cumulative divergence, or laws of uneven 
development, which ensure that "to him that hath shall be given and 
to him that hath not shall be taken away that which he hath" (Myrdal 
1963), in a process of circular and cumulative divergence. 
An illustration of how this refutation has been carried out by 
the proponents of the centre-periphery approach is the subject of 
the next few paragraphs and has largely been drawn from the works 
of Friedmann (1966), Stilwell (1972a; 1974), and Holland (1975; 1976). 
The following may be cited as among the main reasons for the 
failure of the orthodox theory to correspond to reality: 
Firstly, the theoretical unsatisfactory nature of the orthodox model, 
which assumes that demand, supply and the level of technology are 
given and constant. The fact that they are not has meant that the 
ant1cipated diminishing marginal returns to scale in metropolitan 
'centre' regions have not eventuated. To the extent, furthermore, 
* that diseconomies of scale and externalities 
- e.g. in the form of 
pollution and congestion - have set in, they have to a large extent 
been avoided by precisely that class of people responsible for 
decisions regarding industrial location. Thus even the largest 
metropolitan regions have continued to grow and problems of market 
saturation have been avoided, partly by the continuous process of 
'innovation' • 
* See Kohler (1966) both for an explanation of the term 'externalities' 
and for a discussion of the difficulties it has created for orthodox 
theory's comfortable assumptions of coincidence of private and 
social welfares. 
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Secondly, the emergence of nationwide trade unions has led to 
a relative equalization of wage rates in different regions, severely 
reducing, if not altogether eliminating, the need for capital to 
flow to a backward region in search of cheaper labour. 
Thirdly, much new capital investment (two-thirds to four-fifths 
in the 1950s and 1960s according to Holland (1976))is in the form of 
replacement of outdated plant and-equipment existing in the more 
developed regions. 
Fourthly, leading national firms that might have once turned to 
less developed regions in search of cheaper labour can now secure 
far greater gains by turning multinational rather than multiregional, 
for two basic reasons: 
a) The labour savings secured by setting up operations in many 
underdeveloped countries are far greater than any incentives 
governments can offer firms for setting up plant in depressed regions; 
b) These countries have the attraction of being not only 'union 
havens' but also 'tax havens'. 
These then are among the principal reasons for the persistence 
of regional inequalities, i.e. their failure to disappear overtime 
as predicted by the spatial equilibrium approach. As mentioned above, 
howev~r, regional disparities have in reality not only persisted, 
but also tended to widen overtime. A refutation of the orthodox 
approach is not sufficient to explain this widening, and for such 
an explanation we must turn to the approach of the centre-periphery 
theory, which contends that "growth centres, having been established 
for an assortment of historical-geographical reasons, develop 
cumulative advantages so that the gap between their prosperity and 
the rest of the nation tends to widen" (Stilwell 1975, p.61). 
The principal reasons for widening regional disparities include 
the following: 
Firstly, the initial lead established by firms which located 
and expanded in the higher income markets of the walthier regions over 
their peripheral counterparts meant higher cash flows, faster and 
higher self-financing for future capital requirements, more capital-
intensive techniques and, therefore, higher productivity. 
Secondly, this head-start was reinforced by precisely the 
opposite of what is predicted by the orthodox approach, namely capital 
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outflow from less-developed to more-developed regions; private 
investors in the former could earn a higher return on their capital 
by investing it in successful firms of the developed regions. Thus 
less well-structured firms in lagging regions were deprived of the 
funds necessary for their own successful modernisation and 
competetitiveness. 
Thirdly, the higher productivity and profitability of firms in 
leading regions has made even more capital-intensive techniques 
possible, thus both furthering their advantages and offsetting the 
labour shortages that might have been expected in a situation of 
increasing production and constant technique. 
Fourthly, the selective nature of outmigration from the periphery 
(Parr 1966) tends to deprive it of its youngest, most educated, and 
most enterprising population. The selectivity of this outmigration 
from the periphery to the centre may "foreclose adjustments that 
might lead to a recovery and to subsequent growth on a sustained 
basis" (Friedmann 1966, p.17) in the former, while further 
advantaging the latter. 
According to Stilwell (1972a; 1974), not only have regional 
inequalities in economies such as that of Australia or Britain failed 
to disappear as predicted by the orthodox approach, but they are 
widening overtime, as predicted by the centre-periphery approach. 
Using the technique known as 'shift-and-share-analysis', Stilwell 
shows that this is partly due to the fact that 'core' centres, 
having developed first for a variety of historical and geographical 
reasons, exhibit characteristics more favourable to growth than do 
peripheral regions and their growth is partly at the expense of growth 
in the latter; and partly due to corporate preferences for 
centralisation: Stilwell shows that whether one assumes cost-
minimization, revenue-maximisation, profit-maximisation, growth 
maximisation, security, or 'satisficing' behaviour on the part of 
- * investing firms, it is in business' self-interest to centralize. 
A large part of his book (Stilwell 1974) is devoted to the question 
of whether this self interest is consistent with the broader social 
It may be worth noting here that the 'soulful corporation' arguments 
of the 'satisficing' school of thought represented by Carl Kaysen and 
others who argue that profit maximisation has ceased to be the guiding 
principle of business enterprise, were soundly discredited more than 
twenty years ago.by James Earley, who convincingly demonstrated that 
the big corporation, if not more profit-oriented than the individual 
entrepreneur, is at any rate better equipped to pursue (see over) 
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interest. 
Persistent and widening regional inequalities are thus explained 
by the centre-periphery approach in terms of the rationality of a 
private investment-led economic system, and both Holland's and Stilwell's 
conclusions are essentially the same as Myrdals's: "If things were 
left to market forces unhampered by any policy interferences ... 
almost all those economic activities which ••• tend to give a better 
than average return would cluster in certain localities and regions, 
leaving the rest of the country more or less in a backwater" 
(Myrdal 1963, p.26). 
Thus we arrive at what might be termed the capitalist law of 
uneven development ~ 'capitalist' because uneven development is 
intimately connected with the profit motive: "The key link between 
the two is the fact that it is almost always most profitable, from a 
private business point of view, to build on the best. Thus a 
businessman locates a new factory in an urban centre, rather than out 
in the hinterlands, in order to gain access to existing supplies, 
a skilled labour force, and high-income consumers; to maximise 
profits, he hires the best, most qualified workers; a banker extends 
loans to those who are already successful; an educational system 
devotes its best efforts to the superior students, and universities, 
imbued with the private business ethic of "efficiency", offer 
education to those best prepared, most able; promoters locate 
cultural centres amidst urbanites best able to appreciate and pay 
-for them.; the most profitable business firms attract the ·best workers 
and have easiest access to loanable funds; satellite capitalist 
countries, in the interests of efficiency and comparative advantage, 
are induced to specialize in cocoa or peanuts or coffee - to build 
on what they have always done best" (Gurley 1971, pp.330-331). 
Footnote continued from pTevious page ••• 
a policy of profit maximisation. Therefore, the economy of large 
corporations is more, not less, dominated by the logic of profit-
making than the economy of small enterpreneurs ever was. 
(Baran and Sweezy 1968). 
t 
It is not however sufficient to show that regional inequalities 
exist, persist and widen overtime - it must also be shown that 
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they constitute a problem. Of the writers mentioned earlier, 
Stilwell in particular is aware of the need to show this and spends 
considerable effort in doing so. It is thereby shown that regional , 
imbalances cause, or contribute to the intensification and severity 
of, a number of social, economic and environmental problems. 
Firstly, regional inequalities mean the loss of output and income 
and the inefficient utilisation of available resources, especially 
the underutilisation of social infrastructures in depressed regions 
and the congestions costs in precisely the same infrastructure in 
overdeveloped regions (Holland 1976; Stilwell 1972b). Stilwell 
argues that the costs of infrastructure provision are higher in 
existing urban areas than in locations where the expansion of such 
services is not as constrained by existing developments. A survey is 
quoted, showing that "to provide the basic services and facilities 
for a new workforce member (in Sydney) costs six times the amount 
necessary for similar cases in N.S.W. country towns" (Stilwell 1972b, 
p.8). 
Secondly, regional inequalities contribute to the problem of 
inequalities in the distribution of wealth: " .•• There is mounting 
evidence that the effect of metropolitan primacy is to increase the 
degree of inequality within the society ••• , one aspect of the 
problem being the effect of metropolitan growth on land and housing 
prices" (Stilwell 1972b, pp.6-7). 
Thirdly, not only does regional inequality cause severe localised 
unemployment problems and the loss of income and output that tnis 
entails, but it also leads to a higher level of inflation corresponding 
to any pa·rticular overall level of unemployment than would be the case 
if regional inequalities did not exist. This Stilwell explains in 
terms of the Phillips Curve (which shows the relationship between 
the rate of change in earnings and the percentage level of unemployment), 
pointing to evidence which suggests that a change in the rate of 
inflation associated with a given change in unemployment tends to be 
greater in the regions with low unemployment than in those with high 
unemployment. It follows that an increase in unemployment in the latter 
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regions and a corresponding reduction in the former regions (i.e. 
a reduction in regional disparities) would enable the economy to run 
with a lower rate of inflation at any given level of unemployment. 
It is further argued on empirical grounds, as well as by a priori 
reasoning, that core, metropolitan areas form, in effect, "seedbeds 
of inflatior~' (Stilwell 1972b, pp.5-6). 
Lastly, regional imbalance has deleterious environmental effects, 
adversely affecting both the social and physical environment, in the 
cent~e as well as in the periphery. Detailed consideration will be 
given to this aspect of the problem in the appropriate chapter. 
In closing, the centre-periphery approach to the question of 
regional imbalance in ccpitalist economies enables the achievement of 
a number of valuable insights: Firstly, that regional inequalities 
are the natural outcome of the private enterprise system. Secondly, 
that they can be expected to persist and widen overtime in the 
absence of sufficient social intervention. Thirdly, that they 
constitute a problem on a variety of grounds. Fourthly, that they are 
causally related to the more general problems of an economic system 
which is characterised by many types of uneven development, and in 
which the costs and benefits of investment-location decisions to 
private investors diverge from the social costs and benefits of these 
decisions. 
.. CHAPTER 3: UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT: THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL . 
The processes and mechanisms responsible for growing regional 
disparities at the national level are also clearly discernible 
when we examine the growing disparities between the nations of 
* the so-called First and Third Worlds. In addition, it will 
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soon be argued, underdevelopment is characterised by the existence 
of a disarticulated economic system whose various sectors do not 
relate to each other, the export of multiplier mechanisms, the 
extraction of surplus, and a heavy reliance on the export of a 
narrow range of agricultural or mineral connnodities to narrow markets, 
resulting in a form of structural dependence. Furthermore, and as a 
consequence, underdevelopment cannot be viewed apart from (over-) 
development, as the two are intimately and causally connected. 
This conceptual framework not only highlights, clarifies and 
expands the insights offered by the centre-periphery approach to 
regional disparities at the national level but also, it will be 
argued, a) contains various implications for the focus and approach 
to the study of environmental issues generally and b) throws a new 
light on the economic and environmental problems of both centre and 
periphery. It will also be contended that few if any of these 
insights become apparent when the question of underdevelopment is 
perceived in the orthodox 1nanner. 
As the field of study under consideration is highly complex and 
very extensive, the discusi:;ion cannot be anything but schematic, with 
various points of view not receiving the attention they perhaps deserve. 
In an attempt to achieve and retain an acceptable level of coherence, 
this chapter will be divided into a nvmber of parts, each advancing 
a separate part of the argument. 
* It will soon become obvious that I do not subscribe to this concept, 
implicit in which is - among others, equally erroneous - the 
assumption that the First and Third Worlds - the developed and the 
underdeveloped parts of the capitalist world - are largely self-
contaived entities that can be studied apart from each other. 
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Part (i) will consist of an outline of the orthodox approach to 
underdevelopment and its policy prescriptions; part (ii) will be 
devoted to outlining the basic weaknesses of this approach, both in 
terms of the world's failure to conform to the theory's 
prognostigations; part (iii) will provide some of the essential 
arguments of the centre-periphery approach (better known in this field 
as the metropolis-satellite or metropolis-hinterland approach, 
stemming from the outlook of the somewhat divers •'dependency school") 
to underdevelopment, some of which will be taken up in subsequent parts; 
part {iv) will discuss the question of surplus extraction; and 
part (v) will examine further aspects of this approach such as 
disarticulation and structural dependence. 
(i) 
The mainstream approach to underdevelopment, in good currency 
during the 1950s and 1960s but less so in the 1970s, begins by 
assimilating underdevelopment to poverty in general. Thus it greatly 
concerns itself with the various manifestations of poverty, using 
indices such as health, literacy, death rates and life expectancy, and 
per capita income. It is assumed that at one time all nations were 
traditional, primitive societies, with low life expectancy, little 
education, and very low GNP per capita. Then some societies, it is 
argued, developed in one way or another (and there is much controversy 
as to how this came about), some develo?ed later, and others are still 
developing (Jenkins 1971). 
A_ very .systematic and concise formulation of the orthodox theory 
of development and underdevelopment is that of W.W.Rostow, set out in 
his The Stages of Economic Growth, (1960), which "crystallized the 
assumptions of the western image of the world" (Jenkins 1971, p.74). 
Rostow has given a universal theory of the five stages through which, 
the theory argues, all societies either have passed or will have to 
pass (Rostow 1960; Jenkins 1971; Amin 1974): 
(a) The stage of Traditional-Primitive Societies; 
(b) The stage of the preconditions for development characterised 
by 'Traditional Civilizations'; 
(c) The stage of the "take off" characterised by Transitional 
Societies; 
(d) The stage of maturity, characterised by Industrial Revolution 
Societies; and 
• 
20. 
(e) The stage of the High Mass-Consumption Societies. 
Each of those stages is defined in rigidly universalistic 
terms, such as 'the level of savings' (Amin 1974). 
According to Rostow, there is a period of capital accumulation 
which marks the 'preconditions for development stage', after which 
it is possible for a society to 'take off' into sustained growth. 
A lot of data has been collected which is relevant to this theory 
and it results in an evolutionary model of the world (Jenkins 1971, 
Tables 7 and 8, pp.57 and 75-77 respectively). 
'Development' is therefore conceived as a constellation of 
characteristics, prevalent in most western industrial countries, 
which are (implicitly assumed to be desirable) the defining 
characteristics of a high level of 'developedness': 
"The nations of the world are ranked on a theoretical 'ladder of 
development' * according to the degree to which they possess these 
particular attributes. Implicit in this approach is the idea of 
'the gap' between countries which have high scores on this 
'checklist' of attributes and those that do not •.. " (Currey 
1973, pp.18-19). 
The logical imperative following from this division is that 
'development' is a process of acquiring more and more of the missing 
attributes, particularly a higher level of per capita income, to 
be achieved by high rates of economic growth. Economic growth in 
its turn, according to theory, is best achieved by capital 
accumulation - creating the 'preconditions for development' - which 
is the product of savings and investment. A requirement for this 
is a high degree of inequality in the distribution of income and 
wealth inside the 'developing country' as, it is assumed, 
people with a higher income save (and invest) a greater proportion 
of it; thus high inequalities increase the investible portion of 
national income. This process of capital accumulation can be 
speeded up and the level of available capital augmented by the inflow 
* For an example of which see 0enkins (1971) pp.75-77. 
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of foreign capital, in the form of investment and aid. 
Further development-assisting consequences of this infusion 
of foreign capital, it is argued, will be the diffusion of 
modern knowledge, skills, organization, values and technology 
(Camilleri 1976) - 'development assisting' as, 
in this context, 'development' more or less coincides with the 
modernisation of traditional societies in a process of diffusion 
from centres of modernity (Alan Smith in Mortimer 1973). This 
process of modernisation, initially confined to the modern enclave 
in the developing economy, will gradually spread out or 'trickle 
> 
down' to encompass the whole of the hitherto 'traditional' 
hinterland. 
A further main prescription of this theory of development-by-
integration-and-diffusion is that 'developing' countries should 
maximise their income from the production and export of goods for 
which they are best suited and enjoy a 'comparative advantage', 
that is, goods in the production of which the relatively more 
plentiful factors (labour and land) are most intensively employed, 
and the relatively scarce factor (capital) is least intensively 
employed (Currey 1973, Amin 1974). This will maximise their 
importing capacity upon which, together with capital and technology, 
their economic growth is seen to depend (Currey 1973). 
Summing up, the orthodox approach to development and under-
development perceives development as the process of passing through 
a series of stages from tradition to modernity by a strategy of 
capital accumulation and the infusion and diffusion of modern 
techniques, modern values, and capital from the developed to the 
developing countries. 
(ii) 
As mentioned earlier, the orthodox approach to under-
development from which it stems no longer enjoys the good 
currency it was in during the 1950s and 1960s, when it formed the 
basis of roost national and international programs and proposals. 
This has been in no small part due to the growing realisation that 
many of the characteristics of the so-called developed countries 
are not only physically almost impossible to universalise 
(e.g. per capita consumption of energy and irreplaceable mineral 
resources) but also, in large measure, not necessarily conducive 
• 
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to human happiness and well-being. This leads us to the first 
main charge levelled against the orthodox approach, namely that 
in adopting a 'checklist', 'ladder' or 'gap' approach to 
development, it becomes autobiographical and self-justifying, 
ethnocentric and racist (Jenkins 1971; Currey 1973). 
The orthodox approach has come under increasing criticism 
from a variety of quarters and on a variety of other grounds. 
A list of its most important 'sins of omission and commission' 
might include the following: 
1. First, it concentrates upon economic development as an 
objective ou~side the general field of social relations. By 
emphasising the ends, particularly economic chan~e, it assumes 
that the means are of largely neutral character in determining 
the kind of society which change produces, and that they can be 
safely employed regardless of the existing socio-economic context. 
Specifically, it assumes that modern technology is a neutral 
element for social and economic betterment and the development 
record of the last three decades has provided more than 
sufficient grounds for contending that this is simply not so. It 
has become increasingly clear, for example, that the application 
of modern technology to an economic system characterised by 
pervasive inequalities has the effect of intensifying these 
inequalities and creating additional ones. The job and craft-
destroying, pauperising effect, of the introduction of modern 
technology to many 'Third World' Nations have been well 
documented (George 1976; Smith in Mortimer 1973), as have been 
the deleterious consequences of its most celebrated example, the 
'Green Revolution'. It is true that Norman Borlaug's work 
represents a significant agricult~ral breakthrough: Mexican 
wheat yields tripled in only two decades, while India's 1971 
harvest of over 100 million tons of food grain can only be 
described as a record beater. It is also a fact, however, that -
according to, among others, Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins 
J 
of the Institute for Food and Development Policy - there are now 
more hungry people than ever before, even when allowances are made 
for population increases (Moore Lappe and Collins 1976). With 
the 'Green Revolution' came the increased incidence of tenant and 
sharecropper evictions, the decreased use of agricultural labour, 
. 
' 
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and the increased concentration of land ownership into fewer and 
fewer hands. Not being socially neutral, the new technology 
intensified the contradictions of a system already shot through 
with vast inequalities. The result has been increased, not 
decreased, hunger as, while there might have been more food in 
the market, many more people now have less money to buy it 
(New Internationalist,July 1976). 
2. This brings us to the second main charge against this 
approach to development, namely that by placing too much emphasis 
on the rate of economic growth it a) neglects the very real 
possibility that maximizing this rate may well be incompatible 
with the achievement of other 'ultimate' goals, such as the 
elimination of vast pools of unemployment or of mass poverty, 
or the preservation of the environment's ecological integrity, and 
b) overlooks the fact that, from the point of view of people's 
wellbeing, the content of growth is just as important as its 
rate, if not more so. The very real basis of this charge is 
borne out by the 'development' record of the last three decades: 
Despite quite impressive GNP growth rates (in overall as well as 
per capita terms) sustained over quite a few years in many 
'Third World' countries (a very obvious example being that of 
Brazil or that of Indonesia (Mortimer 1973», indicators of 
general wellbeing such as levels of unemployment and nutritional 
standards are strongly suggestive of a worsening rather than 
improving or even stationary trend for the majority of the 
people (Mortimer 1973; George 1976). While, according to the 
theory's assumptions, this may be held to be an effect of 
development confined to the short run, this 'short-run' is nowhere 
ne9-·pr a visible end today than it was at the beginning of the 
'modernization programs': Research carried out for the 1976 
International Labour Organization World Conference suggests that 
even huge and unprecedented economic growth rates as high as 
12 per cent per year, would not be sufficient to trickle down and 
meet even the basic needs of the 'Third World's' poor by the year 
2000. While, according to a report on India, in order to achieve 
a minimum subsistence level for everyone in the countryside, 
"the upper crust would have to increase their wealth by 2,555 
per cent. On present trends it would take centuries". (New 
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Internationalist, September 1976, p.31). 
It is therefore obvious that the theory's assumption that 
modernization, development and an improved standard of living 
would gradually spread out from the 'modern' enclave to the 
'traditional' hinterland have not been borne out in reality. 
This can be attributed in no small measure not only to the 
fact that, contrary to one of the theory's major assumptions, 
the rich elite do not save and invest (Myrdal 1970), but also 
the fact that the huge inequalities in the distribution of 
income and wealth condoned and advocated by this theory have 
resulted in a form of 'development' dominated by the consumption 
patterns of this elite for capital intensive luxuries - epitomized 
by the motor car - which, whether imported or locally produced 
by foreign enterprise, often soak up scarce foreign exchange 
and result in the domination of the market by patterns of demand 
that have little to do with satisfying peopleB basic needs. As 
put by Eldridge (1976, p.8), 11 the most important criticism 
[of the orthodox approach] is that the content of development 
strategy is crucially affected by internal patterns of 
distribution - in terms of the cake analogy, it is a question of 
quality as well as quantity". As Myrdal (1970) convincingly 
demonstrates, equality and development are not only not 
incompatible but,cont£ary to orthodox assumptions, inequality 
inhibits development in various ways, and egalitarian policies 
are in fact an indispensable concomitant of any meaningful 
development strategy. 
3. The destructive environmental consequences of cash-cropping 
monocultures and the heavy emphasis that is placed in many 
underdeveloped countries on the extraction and export of mineral 
resources will be discussed in some detail later in this paper. 
The point to be made here, constituting another m2jor misgiving 
of the orthodox approach to development, is that it is through 
the theory behind this approach as well as the associated theory 
of comparative advantage that such production and export special-
ization has been actively encouraged and justified on the grounds 
.. 
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that it constitutes the best hope for development. The concept 
of comparative advantage is not only theoretically problematic 
(it treats existing factor endowments as somehow fixed and 
ordained by nature, contrary to evidence suggesting that factor 
endowments of individual societies and continents are politically 
and economically mediated (Senghaas 1975b) ); its prescriptions 
form a questionable policy for development, given the deteriorating 
terms of trade bedevilling many underdeveloped countries, in 
extreme cases resulting in a situation where the foreign exchange 
earned by the export of cash crops is not even sufficient to buy 
the food that could have been grown in their place, much less 
the industrial imports such as machinery and fertilizer required 
for cash crop production (George 1976). 
4. Perhaps the most damaging weakness of orthodox theory is the 
extent to which it falsifies or ignores historical reality. 
Firstly, in recommending development along the lines of free trade 
and integration, it ignores the fact that the now developed 
countries developed and industrialized by policies of protectionism 
(Currey 1973). Secondly, and much more importantly, the theory of 
'stages' of economic growth and development very nearly assumes 
that development as a process takes place in an international 
vacuum, in which the now-developed West developed, as it were, on 
its own. In so doing, this theory totally ignores the crucial 
role played by the now-underdeveloped countries both as sources 
of raw materials for, and markets for the export of the products 
of, the industrial revolution. A noncomitant and equally 
unrealistic premise of orthodox theory lies in viewing under-
development as the result of tradition and backwardness. In thue 
equating and confusing underdevelopment with undevelopment, it 
" ••. takes account neither of the history of the now underdeveloped 
countries nor of their crucial relations with the now developed 
ones over several centuries past ... which transformed the entire 
social fabric of the peoples whose countries are now underdeveloped" 
(Amin 1974, p.8). These questions will be returned to in 
subsequent parts of this chapter. 
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5, A final reason for doubting the validity or theoretical 
consistency of the orthodox approach has already been referred 
to, and is itself the product of the theory's severe weaknesses, 
such as those already discussed: its promises have not been 
fulfilled. The model on which the theory is based is linear and 
unidirectional - "it is- only possible within the model for 
nations to develop and it raises only one problem. That is, why 
do some nations develop and other nations stand still? A large 
proportion of the literature in modern sociology and economics is 
devoted to this problem. In fact there is no problem to be.solved 
because the assumptions of the Rostow model are wrong" (Jenkins 
1971, p.74). Not only has the 'modern sector' failed to expand 
outwards inside individual underdeveloped countries themselves; 
also the substantial inequalities between the 'First and Third 
Worlds' the existence of which, it must be emphasised, is a 
relatively recent phenomenon in the history of mankind, have more 
than tripled this century and continue to grow (Sunkel 1972). 
The failure of orthodox theory to satisfactorily explain the 
origins of inequalities and their persistence are the basis of 
Myrdal's claim that the theory is bankrupt and must be replaced: 
It "cannot provide much of an explanation in causal terms or how 
the facts of international inequalities have come into existence 
and why there is a tendency for the inequalities to grow" 
(Myrdal 1963, p.9). The failure of that theory's prescriptions to 
stem this tendency led to its characterisation by the Cocoyoc 
Declaration on the Human Environment as "a travesty of the idea of 
development1' (New Internationalist 1975). 
The orthodox approach to underdevelopment therefore suffers 
ser.:..,_:.is deficiencies, both in its perception of the nature and 
causes of underdevelopment and, partly as a consequence, in its 
policy prescriptions. Some of these deficiencies have been 
discussed here and are well summed up by Cam::ineri as "intellectual 
ethnocentrism, excessive emphasis on the role of elites as~agents 
* of development, selective treatment of historical reality 
* Most striking, according to Camilleri, being "the _tendency i:o 
overlook or dismiss the significance of the colonial 
experience". 
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and simplistic models of unilinear change" (Camilleri 1976, p.70). 
(iii) 
The vacuum of both intellect and credibility created by 
the growing realization that the dominant theory in the 
field of underdevelopment is shot through with inconsistencies 
and other theoretical weaknesses has been filled to a large extent 
by the centre-periphery approach to development and underdevelopment, 
pioneered by Paul Baran (1973) and extended by writers such as 
Andre Gunder Frank (1971), Samir Amin (1974) and Johan Galtung (1971). 
This approach differs radically from that of the or~hodox policy 
prescriptions. It is also known in this field as the metropolis-
satellite or metropolis-hinterland approach, and its various 
proponents constitute the dependency school of underdevelopment. 
It will be ref erred to here as the dependency approach, and the 
terms 'centre', 'periphery', etc. will be invoked where necessary. 
The dependency approach begins by refuting the orthodox 
definition of underdevelopment (Frank 1971; Amin 1974). It is 
argued that although poverty, illiteracy, low per capita incomes 
etc. may well be manifestations of underdevelopment, they are not 
its defining characteristics. 
The main flaw in the orthodox approach, it is argued, is that 
it confuses underdevelopment with undevelopment. Thus, equating 
underdeveloped countries with the now-developed ones in some past 
stage of their development neglects the fact that the latter may 
have once been undeveloped but were never underdeveloped. (Frank, 
in George 1976, p.95). This is because underdevelopment and 
development as defined here are both the necessary result and 
contemporary manifestation of a single yet dialectically 
contradictory economic structure r~~ process: the capitalist 
system, consisting of both developed and underdeveloped parts. As 
such the two are not relative and quantitative, as the orthodox 
approach assumes and implies, but relational and qualitative 
(Amin 1974, vol.l). 
The principal contribution of three main exponents, Amin, 
Frank and Galtung will be briefly discussed in turn, as, taken as 
a whole, their work is largely representative of the dependency , 
approach. 
• 
28. 
Rostow's theory, Amin (1974) argues, takes account neither of 
the history of the now underdeveloped countries, nor of their 
crucial relations with the now developed ones over several 
centuries past, which transformed the entire social and economic 
fabric. Colonialism transformed societies that were coherent 
and with correspondence between their various sectors (that is, 
societies that, however far from perfect promoters of individual 
wellbeing, could be meaningfully analysed and understood on their 
own), into societies so integrated into a larger worldwide system 
and process that they are incomprehensible apart from their 
external relations. 
According to Amin underdevelopment is therefore characterised 
by the following: 
1) Uneveness of productivity as between sectors; 
2) a disarticulated economic system, whose various sectors carry 
out substantial exchanges not between themselves but with 
markets and businesses outside the national economy; and 
3) External dependence appearing first on the plane of external 
trade, with exports largely made up of primary products and 
imports largely made up of manufactured goods; and secondly 
on the financial side, with outflows of profits, fees, etc. 
by the local subsidiaries of multinational corporations far 
exceedin~ the.inflow of capital. 
None of Rostow's 'stages' account for or describe this situation, 
and his definition of underdevelopment suffers from "confusion 
between independent precapitalist economies and societies, 
characterized by their overall coherence, and economies and 
societies integrated into the dominant capitalist world through 
the historical fact of colonial subjection" (Amin 1974, p.20). 
Frank (1971) also argues that underdevelopment is not an original, 
traditional or historical stage of economic growth, but something that 
has to be understood in terms of two important characteristics of 
capitalism: 
* First, the expropriation of economic surplus from the many 
* Def·ined by Baran (1973, p.132) who first introduced the term in 
1957 as "the difference between society's actual current output 
and its actual current consumption". 
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and its appropriation by the few, an exploitation relations which 
11 in chain-like fashion extends the capitalist link between the 
capitalist world and national metropolises to the regional centers 
(part of whose surplus they appropriate), and from these to local 
centers, and so on to large landowners or merchants who [in turn] 
expropriate surplus from small peasants or tenants, and sometimes 
even from these latter to landless labourers exploited by them in 
turn. At each step along the way, the relative few capitalists 
above exercise monopoly power over the many below" (Frank 1971, p.32). 
Second, the polarization of the capitalist system into metro-
politan centres and peripheral satellites with metropolis expropriat-
ing economic surplus from its satellites and appropriating it for 
its own development, the satellites remaining (or more correctly 
according to this thesis, becoming) underdeveloped for lack of 
access to their own surplus. 
What has come to be known as the Baran-Frank or the dependency, 
thesis is summed up by Frank as follows: 
"These capitalist contradictions [see above] and the historical 
development of the capitalist system have ~enerated underdevelopment 
in the peripheral satellites whose economic surplus was expropriated, 
while generating economic development in the metropolitan areas 
which appropriate that surplus - and, further, that this process 
still continues" (Frank 1971, p.27). 
Galtung (1971), in seeking to explain (1) "The tremendous 
inequality, within and between nations, in almost all aspects of 
human living conditions, including the power to decide over those 
living conditions", and (2) "The resistance of this inequality 
to change" (p.81), utilizes and extends the dependency thesis, and 
his argument may be summarized (in point form owing to its complexity) 
as follows: 
(1) The world consists of Centre and Periphery nations; each 
nation, in its turn, has its centres and its peripheries. 
(2) The Living Condition of a party or group is defined as that 
' party's or group's 'true' interests as they may be observed or 
stipulated by an outsider; it may be measured by using such 
indicators as income, standard of living, quality of life, autonomy. 
• 
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(3) There is pisharmony of interest between two parties if they 
are coupled together in such a way that the living condition ~p 
is increasing; harmony of interest if it is decreasing. 
(4) In a two-nation model, imperialism is conceived of as a 
sophisticated dominance relation between the two, which bases itself 
on a bridgehead, which the centre of the Centre nation establishes 
in the centre of the Periphery nation for the joint benefit of both. 
It is a relation between a Centre and a Periphery nation so that 
(a) there is harmony of interest between the centre in the Centre 
nation and the center in the Periphery nation, 
(b) there is more disharmony of interest within the Periphery 
nation than with the Centre nation, 
(c) there is disharmony of interest between the periphery in the 
Centre nation and the periphery in the Periphery nation. 
Thus imperialism is not merely an international relationship, but a 
combination of intra-and inter-national relationships. 
(5) (a), (b) and (c) above follow once the process of appropriation 
is fully mapped out: In the Periphery, the centre is more enriched 
than the periphery, drawing on part of the latter's surplus. However, 
for part of this enrichment, the centre in the Periphery only serves 
as a transmission belt (e.g. as commercial firms and trading 
companies) for value (e.g. raw materials) forwarded to the Centre 
nation. This value enters the Centre at the centre, with some of 
it drizz1ing down to the periphery. 
(6) There are two mechanisms of imperialism, both concerning the 
relation between the parties concerned: 
(a) The principle of vertical ~. :eraction consisting of a gap 
in processing level between the exports of the Periphery to 
the Centre and the exports of the Centre to the Periphery. 
The Centre exports contain a higher level of processing and 
are of higher complexity and diversity than those of the 
Periphery. Thus the multiulier or spin off effects of 
processing are felt at the Centre, making for a more connected 
society and economy. 
. . -~ - . 
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(b) The principle of feudal interaction, whose main features 
are (i) interaction (trade) between Centre and Periphery is 
vertical, and (ii) interaction between Periphery and 
Periphery is missing. 
(7) These mechanisms have the following economic consequences: 
(a) High levelsof concentration of trading partners in the 
Periphery as opposed to the Centre, both in the case of 
imports and the case of exports; 
(b) Commodity concentration,or the tendency for Periphery nations 
to have only one or very few primary products to export. The 
explanation for this is mainly a historical and not a 
geographical one. 
(c) The combined effect of these two consequences is the structural 
dependency of the Periphery on the Centre: Since the Periphery 
normally has a much smaller GNP than the Centre, the trade 
between them is a much higher percentage of GNP for the 
Periphery, and with both partner and commodity concentration, 
the Periphery becomes particularly vulnerable to fluctuations 
in demand and price. At the same ~ime, the centre in the 
Periphery depends on the Centre for its supply of consumer 
goods; this is largely due to a demand for equality between 
the two centres, maintained by demonstration effects and 
frequent visits to the Centre. 
(8) The vertical interaction relation is the main factor behind 
inequalities in the world today, while the feudal interaction 
structure is the factor that maintains and reinforces this inequality 
by protecting it. 
(9) The two mech~nisms are-used not only between nations but also 
within nations, but less so in the Centre nation than in the 
Periphery nations. 
(10) This model can be expanded by interspersing a third nation 
between the Centre and the Periphery. Such nation could serve 
as a go-between, for example exchanging semi-processed goods with 
highly processed goods upwards, and semi-processed goods with raw 
materials downwards. 
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(11) Imperialism not only operates at the economic level, but also 
at the political, military, communications and cultural levels, 
* each type interacting with and reinforcing the others. Further, the 
more perfectly the two mechanisms are put to work, the less overt 
machinery of oppression is needed. For both of these reasons, perfect 
imperialism is a highly stable system, based on structural rather than 
direct violence. 
Galtung's model therefore further extends and substantiates the claim 
of this approach that when some nations are rich and some are poor, when 
some nations are developed and others are underdeveloped, this .is 
intimately connected with the structure within and between nations. The 
reason it received such detailed attention is that it encapsulates 
virtually all the clairr.s and arguments of the dependency approach to 
underdevelopment. Further, it provides a strikingly realistic 
explanation of the existence of persisting and widening inequalities, 
particularly in the light of the tests for internal consistency to which 
it is subjected (Galtung 1971, pp.101-103), and its application in 
classifying some sixty countries as 'Centre', 'Periphery' or 'Go-Between' 
economies (Galtung 1971, pp.110-111). 
Stlilliuing up, the greatest departure of the dependency approach front 
orthodoxy is contained in the emphasis that it places on the nature of 
the relationship between the developed and underdeveloped countries of 
the capitalist world system, both past (colonial) and present (neo-
colonial). In so doing, it seeks to explain the existence and 
persistence of widening inequalities between nations (i.e. the failure 
of some nations to develop) in terms of (i) the exploitive nature of 
that relationship and (ii) the relationships effect in creating and 
maintaining economic disarticulation in the periphery, resulting in 
(iii) tb2 structural dependence of the periphery on the centre. These 
will be subjected to more detailed attention in the following parts of 
this chapter, which will also attempt to provide some empirical evidence 
in substantiating the validity of this approach. 
* The very terminology of 'development' and 'modernization' being a 
symptom of political and cultural imperialism (c.f. Eldridge 1976). 
** Interestingly enough, Australia seems to emerge as a 'Go-Between' 
economy, in which the development variables are suggestive of a 
'Centre' while the trade variables are more suggestive of a 'Periphery' 
(Galtung 1971, Appendix). 
,·' 
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(iv) 
As shown in the previous part of this chapter, the explanation 
offered by the dependency approach to the question of widening 
inequalities places a great deal of emphasis on what the orthodox 
approach virtually ignores: the nature of the relationship between 
developed and underdeveloped countries, both past and present. In 
this part of the chapter the claim will be discussed, and supported 
by some empirical evidence, that one of the reasons why inequalities 
widen over time and underdeveloped countries have failed to develop 
is constituted by the fact that the nature of that relationship is 
inherently exploitative; that indeed, as Myrdal (1963) has repeatedly 
put it, "from he that hath not is taken what he hath by he that hath". 
Simply put, the claim is that the developed capitalist world as 
a whole developed as rapidly as it did because its development 
received a large measure of assistance from the wealth appropriated 
from the underdeveloped world as a whole; consequently, the latter 
did not develop because its wealth was, and is being, systematically 
expropriated. As Jenkins puts it, "Capital, profits, information, 
skills and knowledge all flow upwards from the nations that have been 
underdeveloped to nations which brought about their underdevelopment 
••• Mankind's surplus value tends to end up in the United States 
because it is U.S. capital that owns the major part of the world 
••. In return for extracting the surplus from man's labour .•• the 
U.S.A. renames the oppressed nations and calls them 'developing 
countries' ... and ignores the fundamental reason for the division 
of the world into rich and poor. Some nations are poor because they 
lack the resources that are necessary to become rich, but for the 
majority of poor nations, this is not the case: they are poor because 
their surplus is expropriated. Some nations are rich because they 
have the resources that are necessary to become rich but for the 
majority of rich nations that is not the case either: they are rich 
because now or in the past, they were imperialist" (Jenkins 1971, p.161). 
While it will be argued below that Jenkins is wrong in implying 
that this is the whole story, what he does suggest is controversial 
enough, and therefore in need of empirical substantiation. 
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That the imperialism of the past - colonialism - was little 
more than a mechanism for providing the Industrial Revolution with 
raw materials and markets is, it is assumed, an accepted fact. For 
such unrepentant sceptics as there may still exist, the words of a 
high-ranking civil servant in the British administration of India 
and Lecturer in Indian History at University College, London, should 
make the point sufficiently clear, if quoted at some length. Writing 
at the tum of this century, Romesh Dutt had this to say: "It is, 
unfortunately, a fact, that in many ways, the sources of national 
wealth in India have been narrowed •mder British rule. India in the 
eighteenth century was a great manufacturing as well as a great 
agricultural country, and the products of the Indian loom supplied 
the markets of Asia and of Europe. It is, unfortunately, true that 
the East India Company and the British Parliament, following the 
selfish commercial policy of a hundred years ago, discouraged Indian 
manufacturers in the early years of British rule in order to encourage 
the rising manufactures of England. Their fixed policy .•• was to 
make India subservient to the industries of Great Britain, and to 
make the Indian people grow raw produce only, in order to supply 
material for the looms and manufacturies of Great Britain. This 
policy was pursued with unwavering resolution and with fatal success; 
orders were sent out, to force Indian artisans to work in the 
Company's factories; .•• prohibitive tariffs excluded Indian silk 
and cotton goods from EnglaPd; English goods were admitted to Indi~ 
free of duty •.. An excise duty has been imposed on the production 
of cotton fabrics in India ..• Agriculture is now virtually the only 
remaining source of national wealth of India •.. but what the British 
Government •.• take as Land Tax at the present day sometimes 
approximates the whole of the economic rent .•.. In one shape or another 
all that could be L·aised in India by excessive taxation flowed to 
Europe ..•. Verily the moisture of India blesses and fertilizes other 
lands" (The Economic History of India, London, 1901; quoted in Baran 
1973, pp. 280-81, e.a.). 
This statement not only establishes the true motives and effects 
of British colonial rule, which resulted in so stupendous a plunder 
that in 1875 the Marquess of Salisbury - then Secretary of State for 
India - warned that, "as India must be bled, the bleeding should be 
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done judiciously" (quoted in Baran 1973, p.278); it also demolishes 
the fallacy perpetrated by the orthodox approach, that the causes of 
underdevelopment are 'backwardness', 'tradition' and 'lack of 
capital', treating colonialism as if it had never existed. Further-
more, it is a case in point of the disarticulating effects that 
colonial subjugation had on the colonies, resulting in the lop-sided 
economics characteristic of many underdeveloped countries today - a 
subject for part (v) of this chapter. 
More contentious is the claim that the process of expropriation 
did not end with political independence but is continuing in th~ 
* present day through the mechanisms of neo-colonialism Adherents 
to this claim have been aware of its contentiousness: the ruling 
ideology on the subject is that, although colonialism may well have 
had deleterious effects on its subjects, the latter have at last 
achjeved political independence and can therefore relate to the 
ex-metropolises in terms that reflect their mutual interests. Any 
view that so radically differs from this ideology must therefore 
demonstrate its credibility by thorough documentation of its tenets. 
In fact, despite their contentiousness, the dependency claims seem 
well founded when we examine observable flows such as those of 
capital (money) and resources between the developed and the under-
developed countries. 
At the level of monetary flows via multinational corporations 
and other agencies of private investment in underdeveloped countries, 
it seems virtually beyond dispute that, with the possible exception 
of a short period of time following the initial investment, more 
money leaves than enters the 'host' economies. 
Thus, according to the chairman of the executive committee of 
the U.S. based Continental Oil Company, "From 1957 to 1962 ..• 
American oil companies spent $4.2 billion in foreign nations and 
brought home earnings of $7.6 billion" (quoted in Sweezy and Magdoff 
1972, p.33). "What is involved here", remark the authors, "is a 
vast transfer of surplus produced abroad to the United States. 
* Defined by African leaders as "the survival of the colonial system 
in spite of the formal recognition of political independence in 
emerging countries, which become the victims of an indirect and 
subtle form of dom~nation by political, economic, military or 
technical forces ... " (see Barratt-Brown 1974, p.256). 
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And these multi-billion-dollar payments to the United States, far 
from enabling the paying countries to acquire title to the assets 
within their borders, go hand in hand with a steady expansion of 
the holdings of the American giants" (Sweezy and Magdoff 1972, p.33). 
This latter point is brought out by the statistics collected by 
another impeccable source - the U.S. Deparcment of Conunerce 
publication Survey of Current Business - according to which during 
the period 1950-1963 American corporations extracted from the rest 
of the world $12 billion more than they invested in it, while at the 
same time adding $28.8 billion to their foreign holdings (for basis 
of computation see Sweezy and Magdoff 1972, p.34). 
In terms of more recent trends, the outflow of profits from 
underdeveloped countries as a whole stood at $3,890.0 million for 
the period 1965-67; $5,291.4 million for 1968-70; and $8,788.9 
million for 1971-73 (computed from data in UNCTAD "Financial Flows 
to and from Developing Countries" TD/B, XV/Misc 3, June 3, 1975, 
by Clairmonte 1975). 
The role of multinational corporatjons in transmitting economic 
surplus out of the underdeveloped countries in the form of dividends, 
fees, patents and hidden charges has been correctly observed by 
economist Joan Robinson: "The international corporations, perfectly 
correctly from their own point of view, arrange their investments 
around the world and manipulate the flow of production from one 
centre to another to suit the requirements of their own profitability, 
not to promote th~ viability and growth of particular economies" 
(Freedom and Necessity, 1970; quoted in Barratt-Brown 1974, p.215). 
Given that the net direction of monetary flows is from the 
underdeveloped to the developed countries, especially to the United 
States, it may be thought that the net flow of goods would be in the 
opposite direction. Precisely the opposite seems to happen in 
reality however, with the exception of manufactured goods and, perhaps, 
low protein foodstuffs such as grain. 
Thus a boredom of evidence exists (Myrdal 1970; Borgstrom 1972, 
1973; Caldwell 1975; Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1972; George 1976; etc.), 
convincingly demonstrating the existence of what has come to be known 
as the 'protein drain' from the underdeveloped world to the developed 
West in the form of such things as Peruvian fish, Mexican and Indian 
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shrimp, African and Asian groundnuts and other oil-seed crops, 
mainly destined for the markets of Europe and America as animal feed, 
margarine and soap. 
"The almost 3 million tons of grain protein recently contributed 
to the poor nations by the rich and well-fed has been more than 
counterbalanced by the flow to the Western world of no less than 
4 million tons of protein in the form of soybeans, oilseed cakes and 
fishmeal. The West is benefiting from a most deceptive exchange", 
charges Professor Georg Borgstrom (1972, p.79) who, according to 
Gunnar Myrdal (1970, pp. 96-7), "has done public enlightenment a 
service by reiterating unceasingly the fact that a number of under-
developed countries are continually exporting large quantities of 
high-quality, protein-rich food products to preserve and increase 
over-eating in the affluent, developed countries:" 
To this must be added the vast outflows of low food value -
or non food - cash crops, such as sugar, coffee, cacao, bananas, 
cotton, jute, and other such products from all of Africa, Asia 
and Latin America (Baran 1973; George 1976), preoccupation with the 
production and export of which has resulted not only in vast expanses 
of environmentally destructive monocultures (Baran 1973), but also 
in the creation of extremely lop-sided economics (see part v) and a 
deter~orating capacity for food production (e.g. George 1976). 
The outflow of mineral and fuel resources from the underdeveloped 
world to the West has also been well established and documented 
(e.g. Mowbray 1972; Camilleri 1976; Magdoff 1969). 
The heavy dependence of western economics on mineral and fuel 
resources from the underdeveloped countries, as well as the relative 
3elf-sufficiency of the socialist bloc, have been well documented 
(Caldwell 1975). Of great importancE. is the very high percentage of 
t~e consumption of such resources taking place in the United States, 
which only possesses within its boundaries adequate supplies of 
about 12 of the 100 or so minerals most essential to its industry 
(Mowbray 1972): "The United States, with 6 percent of the world 
population, uses 35 percent of the worldwide energy consumption, 
50 percent aluminium, 25 percent copper, 40 percent lead, 36 percent 
nickel and zinc, and 30 percent chromium" (Mowbray 1972, p.12). 
• 
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"With a quarter of the world's population, industrial nations consume 
31 percent of the world's [annual consumption of] petroleum and 
95 percent of the natural gas. The United States ••• consumes 
34 percent of the world's oil and gas ..• The Middle East and Asia, 
with one-half of the world's people, consume less than one-tenth 
of the world's petroleum, yet that is where the bulk of the world's 
oil is located." (Weisberg 1971, p.138). 
That such vast outflows of resources should also be accompanied 
by vast monetary outflows is partly a reflection of the fact that 
the extraction, cultivation or harvesting of these resources is 
often in the hands of western corporations; and partly due to the 
related and perennial deterioration of the underdeveloped world's 
terms of trade with developed countries. With the recent exception 
of the oil-producing countries, underdeveloped countries have been 
faced with a situation in which the value of their (primarily 
unprocessed mineral or agricultural) exports has been steadily 
deteriorating, not only relative to their (primarily manufactured) 
imports, but absolutely as well in many cases (e.g. Jenkins 1971; 
Camilleri 1976; Birch 1975; Eldridge 1976; Heilbroner 1972; 
Myrdal 1963; Sunkel 1972). To give but one example of this well-
known phenomenon, the African state of Ghana exported 214,000 tons 
of cocoa in 1954 for i 84 .5 million, while its 1965 export of 
490,000 tons fetched only i:. 68 million - the picture being even more 
dramatic for Nigeria, where the cocoa crop trebled and revenue 
remained the sa.me (Jenkins 1971, p.61). On the whole, taking 1958 
as a base, it is estimated that in the period 1955-1965 the terms of 
trade improved for the major western economies by 8 percent and 
declined for the underdeveloped countries by 11 percent, resulting 
in losses to the latter which in 1965 alone amounted to nearly 
$4,300 million (Camilleri 1976, pp.75-7). 
This situation must be traced, in the final analysis, to the 
weakness of underdeveloped countries'marketing position vis a vis 
the developed industrial economies, which can be explained largely 
in terms of two factors: commodity and market concentration. Using 
data from ECLA, IMF and IBRD publications (all United States agencies), 
Camilleri (1976) calculates that, in 1964, cereals constituted 
35 percent of the total of Argentina's exports, while coffee accounted 
for 53 percent of Brazilian exports; an equally dominant role was 
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played by tea in Ceylon (60 percent), jute and hemp in Pakistan 
(50 percent), cocoa in Ghana (65 percent) and groundnut oil in 
Senegal (70 percent); in 1968, 90 percent of all Latin American 
exports consisted of agricultural and mining products. On the 
question of trading partners, Western Europe aclounted for 85 percent 
of African exports in 1965; the United States and Canada for 
47.5 percent of Latin American exports; in 1973, Bolivia depended 
on the U.S. and the U.K. for 77 percent of its exports; South 
Korea (70 percent), the Philippines (70 percent) and Indonesia 
(66 percent) on the U.S. and Japan; Algeria (64 percent) on France, 
Germany and the U.S.; and Zaire (62 percent) on Belgium and Italy. 
This, it may be noted, provides a striking illustration in reality 
of Galtung's (1971) theoretical "mechanisms of imperialism", 
vertical and feudal relations. 
In conclusion, the claim of the dependency approach that the 
relationship between the underdeveloped countries and the developed 
west has been, and continues to be, an exploitative one, is a claim 
quite well borne out by the evidence. It is a major strength of 
the dependency approach that this is being increasingly recognized 
today, especially by the proposals for a 'New World Economic Order', 
currently being pressed by the so-called Group of 77, calling for 
remedies such as the formation of producer cartels; agreement with 
consumer countries for some kind of indexation of commodity prices 
to those of manufactured goods; and diversification of exports as 
* well as higher levels of local processing . 
This realization is also evident in the more recent writings of 
some authors, hitherto very much under the influence of orthodox 
theory, who still however reason that as "underdeveloped countries 
are not in a position to use those commodities themselves", they 
should '~trive towards obtaining a much higher return on their 
commodities, especially their irreplaceable mineral wealth" 
(Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1972, p.405). 
These proposals and proponents are however committing basic-
ally the same error as those adherents to the dependency approach 
who attempt to explain underdevelopment exclusively in terms of 
* For a good description and critique of the main proposals, see 
Eldridge (1976). 
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exploitative trade relationships (Jenkins 1971, p.16l(quoted earlier); 
Sweezy and Magdoff 1972; Magdoff 1969). To do so however would be 
implying that the essence of the whole problem is merely an inter-
national one, to be rectified by, perhaps, increased aid or the 
local reinvestment of multinational profits rather than their 
repatriation. 
The problem here however is that the integration of under-
developed countries to the west via the presence of multinational 
capital has not only meant the extraction of profits for 
repatriation; it has also led the whole economy and society to 
take on characteristics of disarticulated, incoherent economic 
sectors, structural dependence and a very specific class structure. 
As Paul Baran put the point, "The worst of it is, however, that it 
is very hard to say what has been the greater evil as far as the 
economic development of underdeveloped countries is concerned : 
the removal of their economic surplus by foreign capital, or its 
reinvestment by foreign enterprise" (Baran 1973, p. 325). 
The argument here is that to simply concentrate on unequal 
exchange and the appropriation of surplus as the causes of under-
development, and to call for a reversal of this situation as a 
remedy to this malady amounts to committing the twin error of 
(i) uvderestimating the deep-seated effects which colonialism and 
neo-colonialism have already had on the local economies and 
(ii) missing the whole point of neo-colonialism which was to set 
up a governing elite that would exist and operate in a 'harmony 
of interest' (as Galtung ~97~would put it) with the elites of 
the ex-colonial powers - calls for a 'New World Economic Order' 
notwithstanding. These issues will be discussed in the following 
part of this chapter but will not receive the detailed attention 
given to the claim that the relation~!-.' p between the developed 
and underdeveloped parts of the capitalist system is an exploitative 
one. This is partly because they are largely the consequences of 
what has already been discussed; and partly because the implications 
of this approach for the study of spatial imbalance and environmental 
deterioration largely follow from what has already been discussed. 
.. 
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(v) 
The two claims of the dependency approach that will receive 
further attention here are (a) that the economies of nations 
subjected to colonialism and nee-colonialism have been distorted in 
severe and specific ways, and (b) that a simultaneous effect of this 
process, at the socio-political level, was the creation of a ruling 
elite whose interests largely coincide not with those of their ovm 
people but with those of their respective counterparts in the 
developed countries. 
On the first point, the disarticulating effects that colonialism 
has had by destroying indigenous handicrafts and industries and by 
converting relatively advanced - or at least coherent - economies 
into sources of raw materials and captive markets for the products 
of the Industrial Revolution were generally the same everywhere as 
the effect of British colonialism on India, discussed earlier 
(Amin 1974; Baran 1973; Sunkel 1972; Barratt-Brown 1974). A similar 
process took place inside the developed countries themselves, in 
the early days of the Industrial Revolution as well as in more 
recent times as the example of Italy demonstrates (Myrdal 1963) . 
The essential difference however was that in the case of the under-
developed countries this resulted in the transfer to the colonial 
west of the spin-off effects and multiplier mechanisms associated 
with processing and manufacturing and which caused accumulation and 
industrialisatton to be a cumulative process (Amin 1974; Myrdal 1963; 
Galtung 1971); further, it led to a situation (persisting to this 
day as the earlier discussion on cash crops and the composition of 
trade demonstrates) in which whole countries were turned into the 
mere suppliers of one or two agricultural commodities, a trend 
perceived with considerable foresight by John Stuart Mill in the 
middle of the last century (in, Guest 1976), as well as by his 
contemporary, Karl Marx: "The cheapness of the articles produced by 
machinery, and the improved means of transport and communications, 
furnish the weapons for conquering foreign markets. By ruining 
handicraft production in other countries, machinery forcibly converts 
them into fields for the supply of its raw material. In this way 
East India was comp~lled to produce cotton, wool, hemp, jute and 
indigo for Great Britain. A new and international division of 
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labour, a division suited to the requirements of the chief centres 
of modern industry springs up, and converts one part of the globe 
into a chiefly agricultural field of production for supplying the 
other part which remains a chiefly industrial field11 (Capital, vol. l; 
quoted in Sweezy 1972, p.162). 
Once this is realized, it becomes quite clear that the future 
of the system cannot be adequately analyzed in terms of the forces 
at work in any part of the system but must take full account of 
the modus operandi of the system as a whole (Sweezy 1972; Amin 1974; 
Fra'lk 1971). 
Therefore underdeveloped countries constitute incoherent 
economies, whose various economic se.ctors are complementary not with 
each other but with respective sectors in western economies to which 
rhey are vertically integrated (Amin 1974; Camilleri 1976; 
Senghaas 1975a, 1975b; Sunkel 1972; Wallerstein 1974). This forms 
the basis not only of the argument that they cannot be meaningfully 
studied in their ovm right (Amin 1974), but also of the very 
important claim that underlying the grave environmental problems 
facing both the developed and the underdeveloped countries - the 
respective violation of the router' and 'inner' limits of the 
environment's integrity are the inequities characterising the 
relationship between rich and poor (Cocoyoc Declaration on the 
Human Environment, New Internationalist 32, 1975; Mesarovic and 
Pestel 1975; Rowland 1973). 
Furthermore, underdeveloped countries constitute incoherent 
societies, whose various classes relate differently to, and have a 
greatly differing interest in the continuation of, this symbiotic 
relationship with the developed West. It will be remembered that 
the dep2ndency model (Galtung 1971) postulates a harmony of 
interesL between the centre in the Periphery (i.e. the elite in an 
underdeveloped country) and the Centre (developed country), as well 
as a disharmony of interest between the centre and the periphery in 
the Periphery; further, that the centre in the Periphery constitutes 
the 'bridgehead' through which the unequal relationship between 
Centre and Periphery is maintained, and via which the Centre 
extracts wealth from the periphery in the Periphery. 
,, 
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Thus Jawaharhal Nehru observed in 1946 that in India "British 
rule .•• consolidated itself by creating new classes and vested 
interests who were tied up with that rule and whose priveleges 
depended on its continuance" (The Discovery of India, 1946, quoted 
in Baran 1973, p.283). 
The orthodox attitude to the huge inequalities which exist 
within underdeveloped countries, as we noted earlier, is that such 
inequalities are necessary to maximize the investible portion of 
national income, so as to produce the capital necessary for 
independent industrialization and development. We also saw however 
that the rich don't invest as much as they engage in the consumption 
of western luxuries (Myrdal 1970), subject as they are to the 
" ••. flow of foreign values and standards [whose function it is] to 
produce public tastes and consumer wants which bear little 
relationship to the needs of underdeveloped societies. Thus, for 
example, in Latin America the production of facilities of the car 
industry ... restricted in any case to a small and privileged 
minority, absorb many of the resources which would otherwise be 
made available for the production of more universally accessible 
means of transport such as bicycles, buses and trains. The 
transmission of imported standards of consumption invariably 
results in a misallocation of resources and imbalanced development. 
Another deleterious consequence of multinational investment is 
the natural inclination of the indigenous personnel, who are 
directly or indirectly involved with the foreign corporation to 
absorb its cultural package for the purpose of personal achievement • 
•.• Gradually there emerges a new class of entrepreneurs highly 
dependent on the foreign firm, predisposed to accept its ideology 
but indifferent and even hostile towards any concept of power 
sharing or distributive justice" (Cani [ Ueri 1976, p .111). 
Camilleri thus makes a number of significant points: 
First the point made earlier, that inequalities of income hinder 
and distort, rather than assist, the development process. 
Second, that the main contention of the dependency approach is 
not so much that underdeveloped countries are doomed to eternally 
low levels of industrialization unless they break out of their 
relationship with the industrialized West (Warren 1973); but that 
• 
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any such industrializacion (Sunkel 1972; Senghaas 1975b; Holland 
1975) is likely to be distorted and unbalanced and unlikely to assist 
in meeting the basic needs of the masses because (a) it will 
inevitably reflect the existing income distribution and patterns of 
* demand, and (b) is unlikely to be initiated by local capital 
(whose nature and orientation is closely tied up with foreign capital), 
which is merchant or 'comprador' rather than industrial or 
nationalistic (Barratt-Bro~m 1974; Clairmonte 1975; Baran 1973). 
Third, that it makes little sense and is in fact positively 
misleading to talk about 'rich' and 'poor' nations, as if these 
comprised of undifferentiated wholes, in similar circumstances and 
with similar interests: "Though doubtless inconvenient at the 
level of diplomacy, it would be far more realistic to talk about 
rich and poor people, groups and classes in as specific a way as 
possible" (Eldridge 1976, p.11). 
Fourth, that the rationality of the ruling elite will be 
largely that of the multinational corporation, not only because of 
the 'infusion of modern values' but also because their interests are 
inextricably tied up together. Not only do ruling elites rely on 
the operations of multinationals for their economic fortunes, but 
multinationals rely on the loyalty of -chese elites "to keep these 
countries open to capitalist enterprise" (Barratt-Brown 1974, p.215). 
The implication of this is that ruling elites can be hardly any 
more concerned about the viability and growth of their ~ountries, 
let alone about any ideas of redistribution or ecological integrity, 
than multinational corporations are (Joan Robinson in: Barrat-
Brown 1974). For example, the almost irreversible state of 
environmental degradation in Sabah; the "extravagant exploitation 
of its natural forest resources - its main source of export income 
and its failure to get the proper return for these; and the absence 
of steps to ensure the wellbeing of present and later generations 
of Sabahans" (Jones et al. 1977), cannot be attributed to ignorance, 
irresponsibility, or failure to take into account the environmental 
dimension, as the authors imply. For "one can only characterize 
this behaviour of the ruling elites in the peripheries as the 
* Even though a great deal of it is financed by multinationals by 
local borrowing (Sunkel 1972; Barratt-Brown 1974). 
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expression of a miscalculation if one attributes to them genuine 
development intentions, i.e. a strategy for satisfying mass needs. 
If one does not presume such an intention this behaviour is 
rational in the sense that it aims ... at the survival of the elites 
within the framework of integration into the world capitalist market" 
(Senghaas 1975b, p.261). 
In conclusion, the many manifestations of the problem of 
underdevelopment have to be understood not only in terms of the 
position of underdeveloped countries in the international capitalist 
system but also in terms of the internal structure of underdevelopment. 
The asymmetry that characterizes the relationship between the developed 
and underdeveloped parts of the capitalist world cannot be rectified 
by simply stemming the flow of profits or by improving the terms of 
trade. Talking in terms of rich and poor nations blurs the disharmony 
of interest inside underdeveloped countries as well as the harmony of 
interest between the two centres. 
Concluding this chapter as a whole, the dependence of 
industrialized societies on the 'Third World' (crucial as this chapter 
has shown it to be and highlighted as it has been be recent political 
events such as the so-called energy crisis) pales into relative 
insignificance (considering the western world's powerful economic 
position) when compared with the deep-rooted structural dependence of 
underdeveloped countries on the economic processes of the West, in 
the context of a world economic system dominated by the latter 
(Sunkel 1972). 
The underdeveloped countries do not represent coherent or 
autonomous economies, characterized as they are by unbalanced, lop-
sided development and economic sectors with little cohesion, the 
result of their historic integration into a system of exploitative 
and unequally divided international division of labour. Thus they 
represent "a reflex reaction to the developmental direction of the 
world economic system, which is decisively determined by the capitalist 
industrial nations" (Senghaas 1975a, p.249). By concentrating on the 
nature of that integration, both in its colonialist and in its 
present form, the dependency approach yields the important conclusion 
that development and underdevelopment are intimately and causally 
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related, the development of some countries resulting in the under-
development of others. 
By placing due emphasis on the linkages between seemingly 
unrelated social and economic phenomena, the centre-periphery approach 
to the question of regional and national inequalities not only 
explains their persistence and growth over time; it also results in 
findings rich in their implications both for the problems of remote 
regions such as Tasmania and for the study of wider environmental 
issues, the subject of the following chapter. 
., 
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CHAPTER 4: UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE 
(a) THE SUBJECT HATTER OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
Central to the preoccupations of environmentalists have been 
their efforts to understand and convey an understanding of the highly 
complex and often very subtle ways in which the seemingly unrelated 
or distant parts of the natural environment relate to and depend on 
each other for the smooth functioning of the whole. Thus, environ-
mentalists have been greatly concerned in pointing out how man's 
impact on one part or level of the natural world may manifest itself 
in quite deleterious ways as it is transmitted through the natural 
web by, for example, the food chain. 
This has been the traditional subject matter of ecology, which 
since a little more than a decade ago has achieved the status of a 
household word, with the widespread realization that the human 
environment was being systematically poisoned by harmful substances 
at rates beyond those with which nature could cope, resulting in 
various forms of atmospheric and water pollution; that the 
industrial process was churning out more and more producer and 
consumer goods at the cost of rapidly disappearing fossil fuels and 
other non-renewable resources; that the world's population was 
increasing at rates requiring the everincreasing expansion of 
industrial production to s2tisfy human needs; at the same time, that 
the area of land suitable for the production of foodstuffs cannot be 
increased at will, and attempts to increase productivity by the 
application of fertilizers, pesticides and other such substances was 
leading to new forms of ecological imbalances, such as pollution 
and soil erosion. 
Such has been the seeming urgenc.: of doing something about this 
multifaceted threat to man's environment and its life-sustaining 
processes, that environmentalists such as Ehrlich, especially in his 
earlier writings, were convinced that "there is no time for politics" . 
Thus a view that is re-echoed is that "almost all theories, Liberal 
or Marxist, about the future development of capitalism, imperialism 
or the third world will become of strictly academic interest when 
ecological considerations intervene and so action derived from them 
becomes irrelevant" (quoted in Lowe 1977, p.S). Responsibi]ity for 
.. 
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the deteriorating state of the environment's ecological integrity 
was laid squarely on the shoulders of 'man' - an untidy and 
irresponsible creature, 'fouling his own nest' and committing hubris 
against nature. Faced with a perceived matter of life and death, 
man was exhorted to forget about class differences; 'overdeveloped' 
countries were urged to somehow 'de-develop'; and underdeveloped 
countries were told to 'do something about the Malthusian nightmare', 
in harsh and repressive terms if necessary as 'there is no time for 
democracy' (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1972). 
Reference was made above to the extreme perceptiveness with 
which ecologists perceive the often subtle inter-relatedness of 
natural and biological phenomena. Yet, it is a reflection of the 
fact that environmentalists have largely been drawn from fields of 
the natural sciences such as ecology that this very inadequate 
emphasis has been placed so far on the equally important and 
equally subtle ways in which the various parts of any given social 
and economic system relate to each other, as well as the crucial 
interconnections between social and economic problems. Thus 
Enzenberger charges that the Ehrlichs "have extended their 
researches to human society, but they have not increased their 
knowledge in any way. It has escaped them that human existence 
remains incomprehensible if one totally disregards its social 
determinants •.. [and] that this lacK is damaging to all scientific 
utterances on our present and future" (Enzenberger 1974, p.27). 
It would be unfortunate however if the ecologists' methodological 
ineptitudes caused great numbers of social scientists to carefully 
dissociate themselves from the environmental movement. For, as 
Enzengerger is careful to point out, "it would be a mistake to 
conclude that, because of their boundless ignorance on social matters, 
their statements are absolutely unfounded •.•. To demonstrate that 
they have not been thought through in the area of social causes 
and effects is not to refute them" (Enzenberger 1974, p.27). 
It is increasingly recognized however, that the source and 
seriousness of environmental problems cannot be properly understood, 
nor can alternative proposals for dealing with them be properly 
evaluated, unless one first perceives their intimate relationship 
with the economic system under which they occur, the motivating 
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forces and requirements of that system, and both the power relation-
ships and the kinds of attitudes, values and aspirations that the 
system under consideration engenders and requires. 
Thus, according to biologist Barry Commoner, "There is, in 
fact, a close connection between the immediate practical problems of 
environmental improvement and the apparently remote, theoretical 
questions regarding the design of present economic systems . 
... In the long run effective social action must be based on an 
understanding of the origin of the problem which it intends to 
solve" (Com.~oner 1975, p.283). While for economist Barry Weisberg 
"There can be no way to understand the global disruption of the 
biosphere without understanding the global organization of political 
and economic activity. We must begin with an understanding of 
the nature of production itself" (Weisberg 1971, p.57). And also, 
"the interrelationship between social and biological imbalance 
cannot be overstated" (Weisberg 1971, p. 71). 
Not only is an understanding of social and economic processes 
important for the correct diagnosis of environmental problems; 
coming to grips with terms such as 'poor' and 'rich', 'haves' and 
'have nots', rather than taking refuge in neutral terms such as 
'man', is also important for the eguitable implementation of programs 
of environmental reform that may follow from this diagnosis. As 
historian and social theorist Hugh Stretton has eloquently pointed 
out, there are equal and unequal ways of conserving resources as well 
as of squandering them, and how to conserve is a harder question 
than whether or what to conserve. 
"There are dozens of ways to economize energy : some would 
stop the rich wasting it, others would freeze the poor to death • 
.•. Old city streets or neighbourhoods can be conserved for the 
people who live in them, or they can be conserved by methods which 
drive these people out, bring richer people in, and make 
speculative fortunes for a few richer still. So however urgent 
it may be to wake people up to physical ecological dangers, environ-
mental reformers also need political philosophies ...• Besides being 
less or more effective in technical ways, environmental reform will 
usually also have to be Right, Left, or otherwise contentious in a 
social way .... Rhetoric about universal benefits for everybody 
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fools scarcely anybody these days" (Stretton 1976, p.3). 
Stretton thus argues that conserving resources for the future 
is a socially simplistic notion because it is unidimensional, 
ignoring the fact that the competition for scarce resources does 
not only occur over time but also over class and over space: 
"Should limited fossil fuels serve rich people now, rich people 
later, poor people now, or poor people later? Should scarce metals 
... supply luxuries to rich Americans and Europeans, comforts to 
poorer Americans and Europeans, life-saving necessities to much 
poorer Brazilians or Javanese - or what goods to the grand-chil<'lren 
of which of them?" (Stretton 1976, p.5). 
These questions are simply not asked - let alone answered -
in the copious environmental literature that has appeared in the 
last ten or so years - nor have there been any notable attempts on 
the part of environmentalists to establish the connections between 
ecological and social imbalance that Weisberg regards as crucial to 
the whole environmental issue. One suspects that even if these 
questions were asked, no satisfactory answers would have been 
provided, given the lack of any theoretical understanding of the 
nature of these social imbalances. Except in the 'pressure group' 
(i.e. the American) meaning of the word 'politics', environmentalists 
have on the whole remained strictly non-political animals. 
And yet, Commoner and Weisberg are absolutely correct; the 
relationship between ecological and socio-economic imbalance is a 
crucial one, and so is the importance of understanding it. As will 
be argued in the following part of this chapter, problems of 
pollution, resource exhaustion, soil erosion and even 'over-
population' are usually caused - and almost always intensified - by 
spatial and economic inequalities and their tendency to widen over 
time. They may be usefully thought of as, on the one hand, the 
environmental consequences of overdevelopment and, on the other, 
the environmental consequences of underdevelopment. 
(b) THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF SOME SPECIFIC ENVIR01'MENTAL PROBLEMS 
Stilwell has argued that the question of environmental quality 
must be understood in terms of uneven development as both the social 
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and the physical environment are adversely affected by metropolitan 
primacy (Stilwell 1972b, 1974). The adverse effects on the social 
environment that Stilwell refers to are the much-discussed problems 
of big cities. Important as these are, it is more relevant for 
this paper that the discussion be confined to the effects of spatial 
imbalance on the physical environment. 
The congestion problems of big cities are well knmvn, and 
manifest themselves in a variety of ways, including traffic congestion 
and other such pressures on all fonns of social infrastructure. 
However congestion is not only a cost in itself; it also makes the 
problems of pollution worse than they would otherwise have been, 
particularly water and air pollution. In simple terms, this can be 
demonstrated in terms of two main concepts: 'threshold levels of 
pollution', and the 'interaction of contaminants' (Stilwell 1974, 
pp. 130 ff. ) . 
Threshold levels of pollution are those levels beyond which 
the natural waste-disposing mechanisms in ecological systems cannot 
cope; over-reaching these levels can cause irreversible changes in 
ecological systems, which would not occur if the polluting 
activities were more widely dispersed in space - or would take much 
longer. 
The 'interaction of contaminants' concept is important here 
because, while the air or water systems may well be able to cope 
with individual pollutants reasonably well, a complex of pollutants 
may interact with each other in such a way as to cause irreversible 
ecological change, the total effect being greater and qualitatively 
different than the sum of the parts. 
Therefore, the spatial proximity of the various polluting 
activities in large metropolitan areas - the product, it has been 
the argument of this paper, of the spatial imbalance that character-
izes capitalist economic development - leads to high concentration 
of residuals, more interaction and therefore a more intense pollution 
problem than would exist if the same amount of pollutants was 
discharged over a wider area. 
Furthermore, because of the divergence of private and social 
costs and benefits and the tendency for environmental costs to be 
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unevenly distributed (see earlier discussion), no natural economic 
mechanism exists that would ensure that environmental deterioration 
of this type leads to the decentralization of economic activity. 
That the vast metropolitan cities of the western world should 
become so heavily polluted that they are virtually unfit for human 
habitation (Poleszynski 1977; Galtung 1976; Caldwell 1972; Adamson 
1975) comes as no real surprise in view of the vast amounts of 
energy and mineral resources that constantly flow from the under-
developed countries to the developed west. Given the special 
position of the United States in this matter, it may be worth 
noting that "Los Angeles County alone has more registered 
automobiles than the entire continent of Africa ... [and] the state 
of California consumes as much electricity as •.. China" (Weisberg 
1971, p.148), in illustrating his argu.111ent that "centralization of 
industry and other basic necessities generates ecological imbalances 
both in terms of population congestion as well as the other ecological 
results of intense industrialization" (p.136), and his contention 
that "America as an empire is today the primary and most substantial 
agenl of biological and social destruction" (p.148). 
Key emphasis has been placed by the centre-periphery approach 
to the importance of the processing and manufacturing stages of 
production in creating the spin-off, or multiplier effects that 
lead to development. It was noted earlier in this paper that the 
lack of development in some countries and its presence in others 
can be largely traced to the export of unprocessed raw materials 
from the former to the latter. That development in the west should 
turn into overdevelopment and the serious infringement of the 
environment's 'outer limits' could well have been described as an 
revengefully ironic turn of events, where "the modern King Midas 
becomes a victim of his own greed and. "'Jrns his environment into 
muck rather than gold ... " (Galtung 1971, p.89), were it not for 
the fact that the 'inner limits' of ecological integrity are still 
being seriously infringed at the opposite end of the scale: the 
environmental problems of overdevelopment are rivalled by the 
environmental problems of underdevelopment as a cause for serious 
concern, the two being intimately and causally related to the 
inequities between centre and periphery - the connection being 
.. 
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well articulated by the Cocoyoc Declaration on the Human Environment: 
"Large parts of the world today consist of a centre exploiting a 
periphery and also our conunon heritage, the biosphere" 
(New Internationalist 32, October 1975, p.12) . 
The 'inner limits' of ecological integrity mentioned here 
refer to the poverty, hunger and disease to which large masses of 
people in the underdeveloped world are subject. In the words of 
the Cocoyoc Declaration they constitute as much of an ecological 
threat as does the pollution and congestion of the overdeveloped 
West, not least due to the by now well-established fact that unless 
and until these conditions of human misery and degradation are 
eliminated by meaningful development that centres on the satisfaction 
of basic needs, human fertility rates are unlikely to decline 
(George 1976; Miro 1973; Boserup 1974). 
The environmental consequences of underdevelopment are much 
more extensive however. 
The depletion of non-renewable resources is taking place at 
a very rapid rate, and has been implicit in much of what has been 
already discussed in this paper. The erosion and water pollution 
caused in the process are well documented by Miro (1973, p.121-2). 
Equally as environmentally destructive in their direct and 
indirect consequences are the massive outflows of food crops and 
other agricultural commodities (extensively discussed earlier in 
this paper). These have been many and serious, and have been 
adequately descYibed by writers such as Moore-Lappe and Collins (1976), 
Baran (1973), and Miro (1973). They relate not only to the ecological 
dangers associated with extensive monocultures and the ruthless 
exploitation of the soil's wealth by absentee farmers, but also to 
the process in which flat, fertile land is increasingly being taken 
over by large, often foreign-owned, cash-crop farms and subsistence 
farming is consequently pushed onto marginal lands at the cost of 
irreparable erosion. 
Problems of hunger and environmental destruction, generally 
attributed by environmentalists to 'overpopulation', can thus be seen 
to have their cause in the pervading inequalities behind under-
development. If however overpopulation does in fact constitute an 
environmental threat in certain countries, the evidence of the last 
• 
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decade on the subject would seem to suggest that the answer lies 
not in the enforced sterilization programs attempted in India and 
advocated by many western environmentalists, but in the kind of 
development that would reduce fertility by making large families 
unnecessary (e.g. George 1976). 
Finally, not only are the environmental problems of the 
centre intimately connected to those of the periphery, but may also 
constitute the grounds for further assaults on the fragile 
equatorial and tropical ecosystems where most underdeveloped 
countries are situated: the possjbility that multinational 
corporations, facing increasingly stringent environmental legis-
lation in the developed countries, will increasingly relocate 
their 'dirty' industries and processes in the underdeveloped world, 
a strategy already engaged in by the developed countries, which 
are beginning to "locate polluting industries elsewhere in the 
economic cycle" (Galtung 1973, p.107), and probably welcomed by 
many 'Third World' governments, already engaged in heavy competition 
with each other to attract industry, in what one writer has 
described as an "incentive scramble" (Senghaas 1975b) . 
Such an eventuality would of course be quite consistent with 
the dependency approach and a good illustration of one of its basic 
tenets: that economic development in the periphery takes place 
according to the requirements of the centre, and not according to 
the requirements of the periphery for economic viability, satisfaction 
of basic human needs, or a decent environment. 
_,. 
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CHAPTER 5: UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT AS A TASMANIAN PROBLEM. 
This concluding chapter constitutes a preliminary attempt at 
explaining Tasmania's economic and environmental problems in terms 
of the centre-periphery approach to spatial and economic inequality. 
This will take the form of outlining the principal features of these 
problems and drawing on the conceptual framework of this approach 
to highlight their inter-relatedness. It will be concluded that 
Tasmania's environmental predicaments are largely due to the nature 
of its economic development which should, in turn, be examined and 
understood both in terms of its internal structure and external 
linkages. 
Reiterating and expanding the brief description given at the 
introductory part of this paper, Tasmania's industrial and employment 
structure displays the following principal characteristics: 
First, Tasmania's economy is dominated by a few relatively (by 
Tasmanian standards) large companies, seven of which accounted for 
28 percent of all mining and manufacturing employment in the State 
in 1976: Electrolytic Zinc Co. of Australia Ltd., Associated Pulp 
and Paper Mills Ltd., Cadbury Schweppes Pty. Ltd., Australian 
Newsprint Mills Ltd., Comalco Aluminium (Bell Bay) Pty. Ltd., 
Mount Lyell Mining and Railway Co. Ltd., and Coats Patons (Aust.) 
Pty. Ltd. (Callaghan 1977). Virtually all of these companies are 
local subsidiaries of multinational corporations whose management is 
located outside the confines of the Tasmanian (and, in the last 
analysis, the Australian) economy. 
Second, these companies largely operate on an import-export . 
basis in what is basically an export oriented economy. Therefore, 
while the level of their operations is a particularly important factor 
in determining levels of employment and income (particularly in 
some of the State's regional communities which, like Queenstown, 
depend on one or two industries or companies for their very 
existence); and while the frequent difficulties of most of them 
directly or indirectly affect the State's whole economy; the fact 
that they export their products and, in some cases, import most of 
their production materials, means that they "do not have as big an 
economic effect on the State as is sometimes suggested" (Callaghan 
1977, p.35). 
. '
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They do however, and this is the third point, contribute to the 
State's high degree of vulnerability to forces outside its control, 
such as demand and price fluctuations in overseas markets for its 
principal export products (Wilde 1977; Callaghan 1977; McRobie 1976). 
Thus Callaghan points to the "need to reduce the vulnerability of 
the Tasmanian economy to cyclical business fluctuations conveyed 
through the large companies" (Callaghan 1977, p.36); while, for 
George McRobie, "one of the principal goals of a development 
strategy ... would be to maximize local control over the economic and 
social environment, and minimize dependence upon the vagaries of the 
world market" (McRobie 1976, p.3). 
Fourth, the vulnerability of the State to forces outside its own 
0 
control is partly due to the preponderance in the ecnomy of a few 
export oriented large companies whose management decisions are 
taken outside the State; partly intensified by the tendency of 
many of these companies (more clearly observable in recent years), 
to scale down their level of operations in Tasmania, or even leave 
the State altogether, usually to expand production somewhere else; 
and partly due to the high degree of export specialization 
characteristic of the State's economy, both in terms of markets and 
of products. Thus~ out of total 01erseas exports valued at $250.6 
million in 1975-76, 72 percent ($180.5 million) comprised seven 
products (beef and veal, copper ore and concentrates, iron ore and 
concentrates, lead ore and concentrates, refined zinc, wqodchips, 
and greasy wool); at the same time, Japan, the United States and 
the United Kingdom constitute the State's main overseas export 
markets (imports are more diversified), with Japan receiving some 
44 percent of overseas exports (Australian Bureau of Statistics 
tables reproduced in: Callaghan 1977, pp.18, 20). 
* "The majority of existing Tasmanian-based industries do not envisage 
significant growth of their business activities within Tasmania and 
I was unable to find any significant new areas of development" 
(Callaghan 1977, p.34). 
. . -
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Fifth, industry in Tasmania is characterized by resource 
extraction and basic first stage processing, and lacking in the 
more sophisticated types of processing and manufacturing (Callaghan 
1977; Wilde 1977; Young 1976), and heavy reliance is placed on the 
import of manufactured consumer and producer goods (Callaghan 1977). 
This has implications not only in terms of the low return received on 
the State's exported natural wealth (Young (1976) insists on these 
grounds that no primary product should be exported without having 
undergone processing); but also in terms of the loss to Tasmania 
of the multiplier effects such processing and manufacturing would 
have on the State's economy, but which is presently exported to other 
states and countries. 
Sixth, these characteristics of the State's industrial structure 
are reflected in its employment structure features ~hich include 
persistently higher levels of unemployment than in the rest of 
Australia, by as much as one-third; lower levels of participation in 
the work force, particularly by married females and the young; limited 
choice of employer and types of employment; limited promotion 
prospects and career opportunities of an administrative nature; and a 
relative lack of stability of employment. These result in a steady 
flow of net outmigration, particularly by the young and the educated, 
a major object of the State Strategy Plan's concern (Lyneman 1976; 
Callaghan 1977; Wilde 1977). The State's employment problem -
particularly severe· in some of the regional communities but increasingly 
so in the metropolitan areas as well - has been a major concern of 
successive State governments, reflected in various policies designed 
to attract industry, notably that of providing vast amounts of 
hydro-electricity to industrial users at unusually low rates 
(Callaghan 1977). 
Turning to the State's environmental problems, we find that, in 
the words of a visiting consultant, "The general evidence of pollution 
is startling for so small a population. Not only is water pollution 
widespread, but includes both highly toxic compounds and pathogenic 
materials. The rivers are polluted by smelters, refineries, pulp 
mills, chemical plants and by discharge of raw sewage. Pollution has 
been measured, with undetermined accuracy, at supra-dangerous levels 
of mercury and cadmium, zinc and copper These are among the 
most lethal compounds known to man .. . [• 1 1 ] in eve s much in excess 
.. 
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of levels which have caused very serious health problems in Canada-
U. S.A. and approach[ing] the Japanese Minamata levels" (Young 
1976 - Xerox copy, page number cannot be determined). The 
contamination of the River Derwent is a particularly well-knm..m problem 
area, and Young's concern over this leads him to conclude that "law 
prohibiting the discharge of mercury is absolutely necessary" 
(Young 1976}, 
As well as facing these serious pollution problems, Tasmania is 
also subject to problems of resource conservation, particularly in 
the form of preserving some of the world's most unique flora and 
wilderness areas - the nationwide controversy surrounding such events 
as the flooding of Lake Pedder and the likelihood of a similar 
controversy over the proposed Gordon River power scheme being cases 
in point. Young (1976) also notes with concern the rapid rate at 
which the State 1 s forests are being depleted, pointing to the fact that 
only four percent of the eucalypt and six percent of the myrtle still 
standing are protected by State forest reserves; furthermore, this 
situation is placing under a direct threat the survival of many of 
the State's native animals and birds whose habitat was eucalypt 
(Young 1976). 
Underlying these environmental problems and adding a further 
dimension to their seriousness is the serious lack of official concern 
over the situation, an indication of which is the almost total lack of 
serious attention to the environmental dimension in the recent 
State Strategy Plan (Lyneman 1976). Young noted with concern 
the prevailing public service attitude "that Tasmania is somehow 
unique, that WHO mercury standards are unrealistic, and that to 
Tasmani:?ns mercury is a vitamin". He further states that Tasmania's 
resource laws are permissive, usually first stating that no damage 
may be done to the environment and then proceeding to exceptions: 
"The result is a codification of specific a'uthority to permit 
harvests, destruction and poll~tion. Where such codification permits 
the passage to future generations of a diminished resource base, it 
does so in defiance of the concept of stewardship on which it is 
based". Furthermore, Young argues, where levels of pollution similar 
to those facing Tasmania have been found in other countries, they 
·• 
have been recognised as health problems: "Geoepidemiological studies 
follow. There is a public outcry. Industries are closed down, often 
after bitter legal battles, and usually a number of public figures 
fail to gain re-election" 
Tasmania (Young 1976). 
but apparently not so in the case of 
Therefore the State is facing quite severe economic as well as 
environmental problems, and while the former receive adequate 
recognition at both State (Lyneman- 1976) and Federal (Callaghan 1977) 
government level, the latter do not (Young 1976). It is to the merit 
of the centre~periphery approach advocated in this paper that not only 
does it adquately explain the State's economic problems; it also 
explains both the environmental problems themselves, as well as 
official and public attitudes towards them, as largP.ly a reflection of 
these economic maladies. 
Thus a centre-periphery approach to Tasmania's economic problems 
would trace the State's economic structure to factors such as the 
tendency for industrial development to concentrate in the centre 
reg:tons (Melbourne and Sydney), drawing resources, capital, as well 
as 'human capital' to those regions. It would be noted that Tasmania 
seems to be continui11g to serve its historical role as a supplier of 
agricultural produce and other raw materials to a metropolis, be it 
Britain, the United States or Japan. It would relate the tendency 
for multinationals to sc8le down their operations in Tasmania to their 
simultaneous tendency to expand operations in various underdeveloped 
* (Holland 1975; 1976). It would note both the export of countries 
multiplier effects in the form of unprocessed goods, and the loss to 
the economy of the State implied by the subsequently much higher value 
contained in the manufactured products embodying these goods - an 
implication bei11g that, contrary to ~ffevailing opinion, Tasmania is 
subsidizing the centre States of Victoria and New South Wales (as 
well as countries such as Japan). It would explain the State's 
environmental problems neither so much in such bland orthodox terms 
as "strategic problems between economic development .•. recreation and 
-,~ In a process described by one writer as the Latinamericanization 
of Australia (Wheelwright 1977). 
60, 
con$ervation1' (Lyneman 1976, p.58) ~ these conflicts exist 
everywhere ~nor in terms of particular personalities, as has been 
the tendency in the local ~environmental movement'; instead it 
would trace these problems to Tasmania 1 s economic role as a provider 
of raw materials (including energy) and the economic structure that 
this role has dictated on the State since its days of white 
settlement. It would further explain the seeming lack of official 
concern over these problems not so much in terms of a 'comprador 
class 1 ~ the analogy should not be stretched too far, though even 
this may be a useful term to describe and explain certain situations -
but in terms of the economic problems themselves, particularly the 
State's failure to attract industrial activity of sufficient levels 
and diversity in order to satisfy the demands of a job-conscious 
electorate. The latter's seeming preference for satisfying and 
well-paying employment over a clean environment - a study in political 
economy in itself - must mean that a government would need to show 
more than its ordinary share of courage, determination and lack of 
concern over re-election, if it is to adequately preserve the State's 
ecological integrity in the face of perennial stagnation and high 
and rising unemployment. 
There would seem to be more need than ever before for concerned 
environmentalists to at least begin to come to grips with questions 
of political economy -- even though its insights make the possibility 
of effectively.solving environn1ental problems within the existing 
economic.framework appear quite remote. (Stilwell 1972b; · 1974). 
Adamson, P., 1975; 
Adamson, P., 1976; 
Amin, S., 1974; 
Baran, P.A., 1973; 
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